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// Copyright 2015 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "components/gcm_driver/crypto/gcm_message_cryptographer.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <sstream>
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/memory/ptr_util.h"
#include "base/numerics/safe_math.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/sys_byteorder.h"
#include "crypto/hkdf.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/aead.h"
namespace gcm {
namespace {
// Size, in bytes, of the nonce for a record. This must be at least the size
// of a uint64_t, which is used to indicate the record sequence number.
const uint64_t kNonceSize = 12;
// The default record size as defined by httpbis-encryption-encoding-06.
const size_t kDefaultRecordSize = 4096;
// Key size, in bytes, of a valid AEAD_AES_128_GCM key.
const size_t kContentEncryptionKeySize = 16;
// The BoringSSL functions used to seal (encrypt) and open (decrypt) a payload
// follow the same prototype, declared as follows.
using EVP_AEAD_CTX_TransformFunction =
int(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len);
// Implementation of draft 03 of the Web Push Encryption standard:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-webpush-encryption-03
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-02
class WebPushEncryptionDraft03
: public GCMMessageCryptographer::EncryptionScheme {
public:
WebPushEncryptionDraft03() = default;
~WebPushEncryptionDraft03() override = default;
// GCMMessageCryptographer::EncryptionScheme implementation.
std::string DerivePseudoRandomKey(
const base::StringPiece& ecdh_shared_secret,
const base::StringPiece& auth_secret) override {
std::stringstream info_stream;
info_stream << "Content-Encoding: auth" << '\x00';
crypto::HKDF hkdf(ecdh_shared_secret, auth_secret, info_stream.str(),
32, /* key_bytes_to_generate */
0, /* iv_bytes_to_generate */
0 /* subkey_secret_bytes_to_generate */);
return hkdf.client_write_key().as_string();
}
// Creates the info parameter for an HKDF value for the given
// |content_encoding| in accordance with draft-ietf-webpush-encryption-03.
//
// cek_info = "Content-Encoding: aesgcm" || 0x00 || context
// nonce_info = "Content-Encoding: nonce" || 0x00 || context
//
// context = "P-256" || 0x00 ||
// length(recipient_public) || recipient_public ||
// length(sender_public) || sender_public
//
// The length of the public keys must be written as a two octet unsigned
// integer in network byte order (big endian).
std::string GenerateInfoForContentEncoding(
EncodingType type,
const base::StringPiece& recipient_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& sender_public_key) override {
std::stringstream info_stream;
info_stream << "Content-Encoding: ";
switch (type) {
case EncodingType::CONTENT_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
info_stream << "aesgcm";
break;
case EncodingType::NONCE:
info_stream << "nonce";
break;
}
info_stream << '\x00' << "P-256" << '\x00';
uint16_t local_len =
base::HostToNet16(static_cast<uint16_t>(recipient_public_key.size()));
info_stream.write(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&local_len), sizeof(local_len));
info_stream << recipient_public_key;
uint16_t peer_len =
base::HostToNet16(static_cast<uint16_t>(sender_public_key.size()));
info_stream.write(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&peer_len), sizeof(peer_len));
info_stream << sender_public_key;
return info_stream.str();
}
// draft-ietf-webpush-encryption-03 defines that the padding is included at
// the beginning of the message. The first two bytes, in network byte order,
// contain the length of the included padding. Then that exact number of bytes
// must follow as padding, all of which must have a zero value.
//
// TODO(peter): Add support for message padding if the GCMMessageCryptographer
// starts encrypting payloads for reasons other than testing.
std::string CreateRecord(const base::StringPiece& plaintext) override {
std::string record;
record.reserve(sizeof(uint16_t) + plaintext.size());
record.append(sizeof(uint16_t), '\x00');
plaintext.AppendToString(&record);
return record;
}
// The record padding in draft-ietf-webpush-encryption-03 is included at the
// beginning of the record. The first two bytes indicate the length of the
// padding. All padding bytes immediately follow, and must be set to zero.
bool ValidateAndRemovePadding(base::StringPiece& record) override {
// Records must be at least two octets in size (to hold the padding).
// Records that are smaller, i.e. a single octet, are invalid.
if (record.size() < sizeof(uint16_t))
return false;
// Records contain a two-byte, big-endian padding length followed by zero to
// 65535 bytes of padding. Padding bytes must be zero but, since AES-GCM
// authenticates the plaintext, checking and removing padding need not be
// done in constant-time.
uint16_t padding_length = (static_cast<uint8_t>(record[0]) << 8) |
static_cast<uint8_t>(record[1]);
record.remove_prefix(sizeof(uint16_t));
if (padding_length > record.size()) {
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < padding_length; ++i) {
if (record[i] != 0)
return false;
}
record.remove_prefix(padding_length);
return true;
}
private:
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(WebPushEncryptionDraft03);
};
} // namespace
const size_t GCMMessageCryptographer::kAuthenticationTagBytes = 16;
const size_t GCMMessageCryptographer::kSaltSize = 16;
GCMMessageCryptographer::GCMMessageCryptographer(Version version) {
switch (version) {
case Version::DRAFT_03:
encryption_scheme_ = base::MakeUnique<WebPushEncryptionDraft03>();
return;
}
NOTREACHED();
}
GCMMessageCryptographer::~GCMMessageCryptographer() = default;
bool GCMMessageCryptographer::Encrypt(
const base::StringPiece& recipient_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& sender_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& ecdh_shared_secret,
const base::StringPiece& auth_secret,
const base::StringPiece& salt,
const base::StringPiece& plaintext,
size_t* record_size,
std::string* ciphertext) const {
DCHECK_EQ(recipient_public_key.size(), 65u);
DCHECK_EQ(sender_public_key.size(), 65u);
DCHECK(record_size);
DCHECK(ciphertext);
// TODO(peter): DCHECK the lengths of |ecdh_shared_secret|, |auth_secret| and
// |salt|.
if (salt.size() != kSaltSize)
return false;
std::string prk = encryption_scheme_->DerivePseudoRandomKey(
ecdh_shared_secret, auth_secret);
std::string content_encryption_key = DeriveContentEncryptionKey(
recipient_public_key, sender_public_key, prk, salt);
std::string nonce =
DeriveNonce(recipient_public_key, sender_public_key, prk, salt);
std::string record = encryption_scheme_->CreateRecord(plaintext);
std::string encrypted_record;
if (!TransformRecord(Direction::ENCRYPT, record, content_encryption_key,
nonce, &encrypted_record)) {
return false;
}
// The advertised record size must be at least one more than the padded
// plaintext to ensure only one record.
*record_size = std::max(kDefaultRecordSize, record.size() + 1);
ciphertext->swap(encrypted_record);
return true;
}
bool GCMMessageCryptographer::Decrypt(
const base::StringPiece& recipient_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& sender_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& ecdh_shared_secret,
const base::StringPiece& auth_secret,
const base::StringPiece& salt,
const base::StringPiece& ciphertext,
size_t record_size,
std::string* plaintext) const {
DCHECK_EQ(recipient_public_key.size(), 65u);
DCHECK_EQ(sender_public_key.size(), 65u);
DCHECK(plaintext);
// TODO(peter): DCHECK the lengths of |ecdh_shared_secret|, |auth_secret| and
// |salt|.
if (record_size <= 1)
return false;
std::string prk = encryption_scheme_->DerivePseudoRandomKey(
ecdh_shared_secret, auth_secret);
std::string content_encryption_key = DeriveContentEncryptionKey(
recipient_public_key, sender_public_key, prk, salt);
std::string nonce =
DeriveNonce(recipient_public_key, sender_public_key, prk, salt);
// The |ciphertext| must be at least of size kAuthenticationTagBytes, which
// is the case when an empty message with a zero padding length has been
// received. The |record_size| must be large enough to use only one record.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-03#section-2
if (ciphertext.size() < sizeof(uint16_t) + kAuthenticationTagBytes ||
ciphertext.size() > record_size + kAuthenticationTagBytes) {
return false;
}
std::string decrypted_record_string;
if (!TransformRecord(Direction::DECRYPT, ciphertext, content_encryption_key,
nonce, &decrypted_record_string)) {
return false;
}
DCHECK(!decrypted_record_string.empty());
base::StringPiece decrypted_record(decrypted_record_string);
if (!encryption_scheme_->ValidateAndRemovePadding(decrypted_record))
return false;
decrypted_record.CopyToString(plaintext);
return true;
}
bool GCMMessageCryptographer::TransformRecord(Direction direction,
const base::StringPiece& input,
const base::StringPiece& key,
const base::StringPiece& nonce,
std::string* output) const {
DCHECK(output);
const EVP_AEAD* aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
EVP_AEAD_CTX context;
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&context, aead,
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
key.size(), EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, nullptr)) {
return false;
}
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> maximum_output_length(input.size());
if (direction == Direction::ENCRYPT)
maximum_output_length += kAuthenticationTagBytes;
// WriteInto requires the buffer to finish with a NULL-byte.
maximum_output_length += 1;
size_t output_length = 0;
uint8_t* raw_output = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
base::WriteInto(output, maximum_output_length.ValueOrDie()));
EVP_AEAD_CTX_TransformFunction* transform_function =
direction == Direction::ENCRYPT ? EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal : EVP_AEAD_CTX_open;
if (!transform_function(
&context, raw_output, &output_length, output->size(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(nonce.data()), nonce.size(),
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(input.data()), input.size(),
nullptr, 0)) {
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&context);
return false;
}
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&context);
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> expected_output_length(input.size());
if (direction == Direction::ENCRYPT)
expected_output_length += kAuthenticationTagBytes;
else
expected_output_length -= kAuthenticationTagBytes;
DCHECK_EQ(expected_output_length.ValueOrDie(), output_length);
output->resize(output_length);
return true;
}
std::string GCMMessageCryptographer::DeriveContentEncryptionKey(
const base::StringPiece& recipient_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& sender_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& ecdh_shared_secret,
const base::StringPiece& salt) const {
std::string content_encryption_key_info =
encryption_scheme_->GenerateInfoForContentEncoding(
EncryptionScheme::EncodingType::CONTENT_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
recipient_public_key, sender_public_key);
crypto::HKDF hkdf(ecdh_shared_secret, salt, content_encryption_key_info,
kContentEncryptionKeySize, 0, /* iv_bytes_to_generate */
0 /* subkey_secret_bytes_to_generate */);
return hkdf.client_write_key().as_string();
}
std::string GCMMessageCryptographer::DeriveNonce(
const base::StringPiece& recipient_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& sender_public_key,
const base::StringPiece& ecdh_shared_secret,
const base::StringPiece& salt) const {
std::string nonce_info = encryption_scheme_->GenerateInfoForContentEncoding(
EncryptionScheme::EncodingType::NONCE, recipient_public_key,
sender_public_key);
crypto::HKDF hkdf(ecdh_shared_secret, salt, nonce_info, kNonceSize,
0, /* iv_bytes_to_generate */
0 /* subkey_secret_bytes_to_generate */);
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-02
// defines that the result should be XOR'ed with the record's sequence number,
// however, Web Push encryption is limited to a single record per
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-webpush-encryption-03.
return hkdf.client_write_key().as_string();
}
} // namespace gcm