blob: e895162585d394fa0aedf1f90f61d33220448327 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h"
#include <vector>
#include "base/callback_helpers.h"
#include "base/files/file_path.h"
#include "base/files/file_util.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/sha1.h"
#include "base/stl_util.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "base/test/histogram_tester.h"
#include "base/test/scoped_feature_list.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_builtin.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
#include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
#include "net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.h"
#include "net/cert/internal/signature_algorithm.h"
#include "net/cert/test_root_certs.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_util.h"
#include "net/der/input.h"
#include "net/der/parser.h"
#include "net/test/cert_test_util.h"
#include "net/test/gtest_util.h"
#include "net/test/test_certificate_data.h"
#include "net/test/test_data_directory.h"
#include "testing/gmock/include/gmock/gmock.h"
#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
#include "base/android/build_info.h"
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
#include "base/mac/mac_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(OS_WIN)
#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
#endif
// TODO(crbug.com/649017): Add tests that only certificates with
// serverAuth are accepted.
using net::test::IsError;
using net::test::IsOk;
using base::HexEncode;
namespace net {
namespace {
const char kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram[] =
"Net.Certificate.TLSFeatureExtensionWithPrivateRoot";
const char kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram[] =
"Net.Certificate.TLSFeatureExtensionWithPrivateRootHasOCSP";
const char kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram[] = "Net.Certificate.TrustAnchor.Verify";
const char kTrustAnchorVerifyOutOfDateHistogram[] =
"Net.Certificate.TrustAnchor.VerifyOutOfDate";
// Mock CertVerifyProc that sets the CertVerifyResult to a given value for
// all certificates that are Verify()'d
class MockCertVerifyProc : public CertVerifyProc {
public:
explicit MockCertVerifyProc(const CertVerifyResult& result)
: result_(result) {}
// CertVerifyProc implementation:
bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const override { return false; }
bool SupportsOCSPStapling() const override { return false; }
protected:
~MockCertVerifyProc() override = default;
private:
int VerifyInternal(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) override;
const CertVerifyResult result_;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(MockCertVerifyProc);
};
int MockCertVerifyProc::VerifyInternal(
X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
*verify_result = result_;
verify_result->verified_cert = cert;
return OK;
}
// This enum identifies a concrete implemenation of CertVerifyProc.
//
// The type is erased by CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault(), however
// needs to be known for some of the test expectations.
enum CertVerifyProcType {
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_MAC,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_WIN,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN,
};
// Returns the CertVerifyProcType corresponding to what
// CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault() returns. This needs to be kept in sync with
// CreateDefault().
CertVerifyProcType GetDefaultCertVerifyProcType() {
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS)
return CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS;
#elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
return CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID;
#elif defined(OS_IOS)
return CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS;
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
return CERT_VERIFY_PROC_MAC;
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
return CERT_VERIFY_PROC_WIN;
#elif defined(OS_FUCHSIA)
return CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN;
#else
// Will fail to compile.
#endif
}
// Whether the test is running within the iphone simulator.
const bool kTargetIsIphoneSimulator =
#if TARGET_IPHONE_SIMULATOR
true;
#else
false;
#endif
// Returns a textual description of the CertVerifyProc implementation
// that is being tested, used to give better names to parameterized
// tests.
std::string VerifyProcTypeToName(
const testing::TestParamInfo<CertVerifyProcType>& params) {
switch (params.param) {
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS:
return "CertVerifyProcNSS";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID:
return "CertVerifyProcAndroid";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS:
return "CertVerifyProcIOS";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_MAC:
return "CertVerifyProcMac";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_WIN:
return "CertVerifyProcWin";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN:
return "CertVerifyProcBuiltin";
}
return nullptr;
}
// The set of all CertVerifyProcTypes that tests should be
// parameterized on.
const std::vector<CertVerifyProcType> kAllCertVerifiers = {
GetDefaultCertVerifyProcType()
// TODO(crbug.com/649017): Enable this everywhere. Right now this is
// gated on having CertVerifyProcBuiltin understand the roots added
// via TestRootCerts.
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || (defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS))
,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN
#endif
};
// Returns true if a test root added through ScopedTestRoot can verify
// successfully as a target certificate with chain of length 1 on the given
// CertVerifyProcType.
bool ScopedTestRootCanTrustTargetCert(CertVerifyProcType verify_proc_type) {
return verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_MAC ||
verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS ||
verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID;
}
} // namespace
// This fixture is for tests that apply to concrete implementations of
// CertVerifyProc. It will be run for all of the concrete CertVerifyProc types.
//
// It is called "Internal" as it tests the internal methods like
// "VerifyInternal()".
class CertVerifyProcInternalTest
: public testing::TestWithParam<CertVerifyProcType> {
protected:
void SetUp() override {
CertVerifyProcType type = verify_proc_type();
if (type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN) {
verify_proc_ = CreateCertVerifyProcBuiltin();
} else if (type == GetDefaultCertVerifyProcType()) {
verify_proc_ = CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault();
} else {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unhandled CertVerifyProcType";
}
}
int Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
return verify_proc_->Verify(cert, hostname, std::string(), flags, crl_set,
additional_trust_anchors, verify_result);
}
CertVerifyProcType verify_proc_type() const { return GetParam(); }
bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const {
return verify_proc_->SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors();
}
bool SupportsReturningVerifiedChain() const {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
// Before API level 17 (SDK_VERSION_JELLY_BEAN_MR1), Android does
// not expose the APIs necessary to get at the verified
// certificate chain.
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID &&
base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->sdk_int() <
base::android::SDK_VERSION_JELLY_BEAN_MR1)
return false;
#endif
return true;
}
bool WeakKeysAreInvalid() const {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
// Starting with Mac OS 10.12, certs with weak keys are treated as
// (recoverable) invalid certificate errors.
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_MAC &&
base::mac::IsAtLeastOS10_12()) {
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
bool SupportsCRLSet() const {
return verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_WIN ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_MAC ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN;
}
bool SupportsCRLSetsInPathBuilding() const {
return verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_WIN ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN;
}
bool SupportsEV() const {
// TODO(crbug.com/117478): Android and iOS do not support EV.
return verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_WIN ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_MAC ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN;
}
CertVerifyProc* verify_proc() const { return verify_proc_.get(); }
private:
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc_;
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(,
CertVerifyProcInternalTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kAllCertVerifiers),
VerifyProcTypeToName);
// Tests that a certificate is recognized as EV, when the valid EV policy OID
// for the trust anchor is the second candidate EV oid in the target
// certificate. This is a regression test for crbug.com/705285.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, EVVerificationMultipleOID) {
if (!SupportsEV()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as EV verification is not yet supported";
return;
}
// TODO(eroman): Update this test to use a synthetic certificate, so the test
// does not break in the future. The certificate chain in question expires on
// Dec 22 23:59:59 2018 GMT 2018, at which point this test will start failing.
if (base::Time::Now() >
base::Time::UnixEpoch() + base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1545523199)) {
FAIL() << "This test uses a certificate chain which is now expired. Please "
"disable and file a bug.";
return;
}
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "trustcenter.websecurity.symantec.com.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE);
ASSERT_TRUE(chain);
// Build a CRLSet that covers the target certificate.
//
// This way CRLSet coverage will be sufficient for EV revocation checking,
// so this test does not depend on online revocation checking.
ASSERT_EQ(1u, chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
base::StringPiece spki;
ASSERT_TRUE(
asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(
chain->intermediate_buffers()[0].get()),
&spki));
SHA256HashValue spki_sha256;
crypto::SHA256HashString(spki, spki_sha256.data, sizeof(spki_sha256.data));
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set(
CRLSet::ForTesting(false, &spki_sha256, "", "", {}));
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "trustcenter.websecurity.symantec.com", flags,
crl_set.get(), CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
// Target cert has an EV policy, and verifies successfully, but has a chain of
// length 1 because the target cert was directly trusted in the trust store.
// Should verify OK but not with STATUS_IS_EV.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, TrustedTargetCertWithEVPolicy) {
// The policy that "explicit-policy-chain.pem" target certificate asserts.
static const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(), SHA256HashValue(), kEVTestCertPolicy);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "explicit-policy-chain.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
ScopedTestRoot scoped_test_root(cert.get());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "policy_test.example", flags,
nullptr /*crl_set*/, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (ScopedTestRootCanTrustTargetCert(verify_proc_type())) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().empty());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
// Target cert has an EV policy, and verifies successfully with a chain of
// length 1, and its fingerprint matches the cert fingerprint for that ev
// policy. This should never happen in reality, but just test that things don't
// explode if it does.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest,
TrustedTargetCertWithEVPolicyAndEVFingerprint) {
// The policy that "explicit-policy-chain.pem" target certificate asserts.
static const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
// This the fingerprint of the "explicit-policy-chain.pem" target certificate.
// See net/data/ssl/certificates/explicit-policy-chain.pem
static const SHA256HashValue kEVTestCertFingerprint = {
{0x71, 0xac, 0xfa, 0x12, 0xa4, 0x42, 0x31, 0x3c, 0xff, 0x10, 0xd2,
0x9d, 0xb6, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0xe8, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x77, 0xd3, 0x9f, 0xa3,
0x2f, 0xb3, 0x19, 0x8d, 0x46, 0x9f, 0xb7, 0x73, 0x07, 0x30}};
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(),
kEVTestCertFingerprint,
kEVTestCertPolicy);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "explicit-policy-chain.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
ScopedTestRoot scoped_test_root(cert.get());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "policy_test.example", flags,
nullptr /*crl_set*/, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (ScopedTestRootCanTrustTargetCert(verify_proc_type())) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().empty());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
// An EV Root certificate should never be used as an end-entity certificate.
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
// TODO(crbug.com/605457): the test expectation was incorrect on some
// configurations, so disable the test until it is fixed (better to have
// a bug to track a failing test than a false sense of security due to
// false positive).
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, DISABLED_PaypalNullCertParsing) {
// A certificate for www.paypal.com with a NULL byte in the common name.
// From http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/fulldisc/full-disclosure/70363
SHA256HashValue paypal_null_fingerprint = {{0x00}};
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> paypal_null_cert(
X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(paypal_null_der),
sizeof(paypal_null_der)));
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), paypal_null_cert.get());
EXPECT_EQ(paypal_null_fingerprint, X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(
paypal_null_cert->cert_buffer()));
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(paypal_null_cert.get(), "www.paypal.com", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS &&
kTargetIsIphoneSimulator) {
// iOS returns a ERR_CERT_INVALID error on the simulator, while returning
// ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID on the real device.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else {
// TODO(bulach): investigate why macosx and win aren't returning
// ERR_CERT_INVALID or ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
// Either the system crypto library should correctly report a certificate
// name mismatch, or our certificate blacklist should cause us to report an
// invalid certificate.
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_WIN) {
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
(CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID | CERT_STATUS_INVALID));
}
// TODO(crbug.com/649017): What expectations to use for the other verifiers?
}
// Tests the case where the target certificate is accepted by
// X509CertificateBytes, but has errors that should cause verification to fail.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, InvalidTarget) {
base::FilePath certs_dir =
GetTestNetDataDirectory().AppendASCII("parse_certificate_unittest");
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> bad_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "signature_algorithm_null.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(bad_cert);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ok_cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(ok_cert);
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(ok_cert->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_with_bad_target(
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(bad_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates)));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_with_bad_target);
EXPECT_EQ(1U, cert_with_bad_target->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_with_bad_target.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Tests the case where an intermediate certificate is accepted by
// X509CertificateBytes, but has errors that should prevent using it during
// verification. The verification should succeed, since the intermediate
// wasn't necessary.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, UnnecessaryInvalidIntermediate) {
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
base::FilePath certs_dir =
GetTestNetDataDirectory().AppendASCII("parse_certificate_unittest");
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> bad_cert =
x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(base::StringPiece("invalid"));
ASSERT_TRUE(bad_cert);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ok_cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(ok_cert);
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(std::move(bad_cert));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_with_bad_intermediate(
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(ok_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates)));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_with_bad_intermediate);
EXPECT_EQ(1U, cert_with_bad_intermediate->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_with_bad_intermediate.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0u, verify_result.cert_status);
}
// A regression test for http://crbug.com/31497.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy) {
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
// Disabled on Android, as the Android verification libraries require an
// explicit policy to be specified, even when anyPolicy is permitted.
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test on Android";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "explicit-policy-chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "policy_test.example", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0u, verify_result.cert_status);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, RejectExpiredCert) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
// Load root_ca_cert.pem into the test root store.
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
certs_dir, "expired_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
ASSERT_EQ(0U, cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID);
}
// Currently, only RSA and DSA keys are checked for weakness, and our example
// weak size is 768. These could change in the future.
//
// Note that this means there may be false negatives: keys for other
// algorithms and which are weak will pass this test.
static bool IsWeakKeyType(const std::string& key_type) {
size_t pos = key_type.find("-");
std::string size = key_type.substr(0, pos);
std::string type = key_type.substr(pos + 1);
if (type == "rsa" || type == "dsa")
return size == "768";
return false;
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, RejectWeakKeys) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
typedef std::vector<std::string> Strings;
Strings key_types;
// generate-weak-test-chains.sh currently has:
// key_types="768-rsa 1024-rsa 2048-rsa prime256v1-ecdsa"
// We must use the same key types here. The filenames generated look like:
// 2048-rsa-ee-by-768-rsa-intermediate.pem
key_types.push_back("768-rsa");
key_types.push_back("1024-rsa");
key_types.push_back("2048-rsa");
key_types.push_back("prime256v1-ecdsa");
// Add the root that signed the intermediates for this test.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "2048-rsa-root.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), root_cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
// Now test each chain.
for (Strings::const_iterator ee_type = key_types.begin();
ee_type != key_types.end(); ++ee_type) {
for (Strings::const_iterator signer_type = key_types.begin();
signer_type != key_types.end(); ++signer_type) {
std::string basename =
*ee_type + "-ee-by-" + *signer_type + "-intermediate.pem";
SCOPED_TRACE(basename);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, basename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), ee_cert.get());
basename = *signer_type + "-intermediate.pem";
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, basename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), intermediate.get());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(intermediate->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(ee_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (IsWeakKeyType(*ee_type) || IsWeakKeyType(*signer_type)) {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY);
EXPECT_EQ(WeakKeysAreInvalid() ? CERT_STATUS_INVALID : 0,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY);
}
}
}
}
// Regression test for http://crbug.com/108514.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, ExtraneousMD5RootCert) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_MAC) {
// Disabled on OS X - Security.framework doesn't ignore superflous
// certificates provided by servers.
// TODO(eroman): Is this still needed?
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test as Security.framework doesn't ignore "
"superflous certificates provided by servers.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-leaf.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> extra_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-root-md5.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), extra_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-root-sha256.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), root_cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(extra_cert->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(server_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
// The extra MD5 root should be discarded
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1u, verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().front().get(),
root_cert->cert_buffer()));
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.has_md5);
}
// Test for bug 94673.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, GoogleDigiNotarTest) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "google_diginotar.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "diginotar_public_ca_2025.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), intermediate_cert.get());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util ::DupCryptoBuffer(intermediate_cert->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(server_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "mail.google.com", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
// Now turn off revocation checking. Certificate verification should still
// fail.
flags = 0;
error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "mail.google.com", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
}
// Ensures the CertVerifyProc blacklist remains in sorted order, so that it
// can be binary-searched.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, BlacklistIsSorted) {
// Defines kBlacklistedSPKIs.
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_blacklist.inc"
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kBlacklistedSPKIs) - 1; ++i) {
EXPECT_GT(0, memcmp(kBlacklistedSPKIs[i], kBlacklistedSPKIs[i + 1],
crypto::kSHA256Length))
<< " at index " << i;
}
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, DigiNotarCerts) {
static const char* const kDigiNotarFilenames[] = {
"diginotar_root_ca.pem", "diginotar_cyber_ca.pem",
"diginotar_services_1024_ca.pem", "diginotar_pkioverheid.pem",
"diginotar_pkioverheid_g2.pem", NULL,
};
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
for (size_t i = 0; kDigiNotarFilenames[i]; i++) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> diginotar_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, kDigiNotarFilenames[i]);
base::StringPiece spki;
ASSERT_TRUE(asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(
x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(diginotar_cert->cert_buffer()),
&spki));
std::string spki_sha256 = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki);
HashValueVector public_keys;
HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
ASSERT_EQ(hash.size(), spki_sha256.size());
memcpy(hash.data(), spki_sha256.data(), spki_sha256.size());
public_keys.push_back(hash);
EXPECT_TRUE(CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(public_keys))
<< "Public key not blocked for " << kDigiNotarFilenames[i];
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, NameConstraintsOk) {
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "name_constraint_good.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_EQ(0U, leaf->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf.get(), "test.example.com", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
error = Verify(leaf.get(), "foo.test2.example.com", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
}
// This fixture is for testing the verification of a certificate chain which
// has some sort of mismatched signature algorithm (i.e.
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm and TBSCertificate.algorithm are different).
class CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest : public ::testing::Test {
protected:
// In the test setup, SHA384 is given special treatment as an unknown
// algorithm.
static constexpr DigestAlgorithm kUnknownDigestAlgorithm =
DigestAlgorithm::Sha384;
struct CertParams {
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm
DigestAlgorithm cert_algorithm;
// TBSCertificate.algorithm
DigestAlgorithm tbs_algorithm;
};
// On some platforms trying to import a certificate with mismatched signature
// will fail. Consequently the rest of the tests can't be performed.
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms() const {
#if defined(OS_IOS)
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test on iOS because certs with mismatched "
"algorithms cannot be imported";
return false;
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (base::mac::IsAtLeastOS10_12()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test on macOS >= 10.12 because certs with "
"mismatched algorithms cannot be imported";
return false;
}
return true;
#else
return true;
#endif
}
// Shorthand for VerifyChain() where only the leaf's parameters need
// to be specified.
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int VerifyLeaf(const CertParams& leaf_params) {
return VerifyChain({// Target
leaf_params,
// Root
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256}});
}
// Shorthand for VerifyChain() where only the intermediate's parameters need
// to be specified.
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int VerifyIntermediate(
const CertParams& intermediate_params) {
return VerifyChain({// Target
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256},
// Intermediate
intermediate_params,
// Root
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256}});
}
// Shorthand for VerifyChain() where only the root's parameters need to be
// specified.
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int VerifyRoot(const CertParams& root_params) {
return VerifyChain({// Target
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256},
// Intermediate
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256},
// Root
root_params});
}
// Manufactures a certificate chain where each certificate has the indicated
// signature algorithms, and then returns the result of verifying this chain.
//
// TODO(eroman): Instead of building certificates at runtime, move their
// generation to external scripts.
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int VerifyChain(
const std::vector<CertParams>& chain_params) {
auto chain = CreateChain(chain_params);
if (!chain) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed creating certificate chain";
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc =
new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
return verify_proc->Verify(chain.get(), "test.example.com", std::string(),
flags, NULL, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
}
private:
// Overwrites the AlgorithmIdentifier pointed to by |algorithm_sequence| with
// |algorithm|. Note this violates the constness of StringPiece.
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT static bool SetAlgorithmSequence(
DigestAlgorithm algorithm,
base::StringPiece* algorithm_sequence) {
// This string of bytes is the full SEQUENCE for an AlgorithmIdentifier.
std::vector<uint8_t> replacement_sequence;
switch (algorithm) {
case DigestAlgorithm::Sha1:
// sha1WithRSAEncryption
replacement_sequence = {0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00};
break;
case DigestAlgorithm::Sha256:
// sha256WithRSAEncryption
replacement_sequence = {0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00};
break;
case kUnknownDigestAlgorithm:
// This shouldn't be anything meaningful (modified numbers at random).
replacement_sequence = {0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x8a, 0x87, 0x18, 0x46,
0xd7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00};
break;
default:
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unsupported digest algorithm";
return false;
}
// For this simple replacement to work (without modifying any
// other sequence lengths) the original algorithm and replacement
// algorithm must have the same encoded length.
if (algorithm_sequence->size() != replacement_sequence.size()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "AlgorithmIdentifier must have length "
<< replacement_sequence.size();
return false;
}
memcpy(const_cast<char*>(algorithm_sequence->data()),
replacement_sequence.data(), replacement_sequence.size());
return true;
}
// Locate the serial number bytes.
WARN_UNUSED_RESULT static bool ExtractSerialNumberFromDERCert(
base::StringPiece der_cert,
base::StringPiece* serial_value) {
der::Parser parser((der::Input(der_cert)));
der::Parser certificate;
if (!parser.ReadSequence(&certificate))
return false;
der::Parser tbs_certificate;
if (!certificate.ReadSequence(&tbs_certificate))
return false;
bool unused;
if (!tbs_certificate.SkipOptionalTag(
der::kTagConstructed | der::kTagContextSpecific | 0, &unused)) {
return false;
}
// serialNumber
der::Input serial_value_der;
if (!tbs_certificate.ReadTag(der::kInteger, &serial_value_der))
return false;
*serial_value = serial_value_der.AsStringPiece();
return true;
}
// Creates a certificate (based on some base certificate file) using the
// specified signature algorithms.
static scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> CreateCertificate(
const CertParams& params) {
// Dosn't really matter which base certificate is used, so long as it is
// valid and uses a signature AlgorithmIdentifier with the same encoded
// length as sha1WithRSASignature.
const char* kLeafFilename = "name_constraint_good.pem";
auto cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), kLeafFilename, X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
if (!cert) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed to load certificate: " << kLeafFilename;
return nullptr;
}
// Start with the DER bytes of a valid certificate. The der data is copied
// to a new std::string as it will modified to create a new certificate.
std::string cert_der(
x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(cert->cert_buffer()));
// Parse the certificate and identify the locations of interest within
// |cert_der|.
base::StringPiece cert_algorithm_sequence;
base::StringPiece tbs_algorithm_sequence;
if (!asn1::ExtractSignatureAlgorithmsFromDERCert(
cert_der, &cert_algorithm_sequence, &tbs_algorithm_sequence)) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed parsing certificate algorithms";
return nullptr;
}
base::StringPiece serial_value;
if (!ExtractSerialNumberFromDERCert(cert_der, &serial_value)) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed parsing certificate serial number";
return nullptr;
}
// Give each certificate a unique serial number based on its content (which
// in turn is a function of |params|, otherwise importing it may fail.
// Upper bound for last entry in DigestAlgorithm
const int kNumDigestAlgorithms = 15;
*const_cast<char*>(serial_value.data()) +=
static_cast<int>(params.tbs_algorithm) * kNumDigestAlgorithms +
static_cast<int>(params.cert_algorithm);
// Change the signature AlgorithmIdentifiers.
if (!SetAlgorithmSequence(params.cert_algorithm,
&cert_algorithm_sequence) ||
!SetAlgorithmSequence(params.tbs_algorithm, &tbs_algorithm_sequence)) {
return nullptr;
}
// NOTE: The signature is NOT recomputed over TBSCertificate -- for these
// tests it isn't needed.
return X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(cert_der.data(), cert_der.size());
}
static scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> CreateChain(
const std::vector<CertParams>& params) {
// Manufacture a chain with the given combinations of signature algorithms.
// This chain isn't actually a valid chain, but it is good enough for
// testing the base CertVerifyProc.
CertificateList certs;
for (const auto& cert_params : params) {
certs.push_back(CreateCertificate(cert_params));
if (!certs.back())
return nullptr;
}
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
for (size_t i = 1; i < certs.size(); ++i)
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[i]->cert_buffer()));
return X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
}
};
// This is a control test to make sure that the test helper
// VerifyLeaf() works as expected. There is no actual mismatch in the
// algorithms used here.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha1Sha1) {
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
}
// This is a control test to make sure that the test helper
// VerifyLeaf() works as expected. There is no actual mismatch in the
// algorithms used here.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSASignature
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha256Sha256) {
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsOk());
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the leaf certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha1Sha256) {
if (!SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms())
return;
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the leaf certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha256Sha1) {
if (!SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms())
return;
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Unrecognized signature algorithm in the leaf certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: ?
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha256Unknown) {
if (!SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms())
return;
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, kUnknownDigestAlgorithm});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Unrecognized signature algorithm in the leaf certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: ?
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafUnknownSha256) {
if (!SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms())
return;
int rv = VerifyLeaf({kUnknownDigestAlgorithm, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the intermediate certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, IntermediateSha1Sha256) {
if (!SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms())
return;
int rv = VerifyIntermediate({DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the intermediate certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, IntermediateSha256Sha1) {
if (!SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms())
return;
int rv = VerifyIntermediate({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the root certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, RootSha256Sha1) {
if (!SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms())
return;
int rv = VerifyRoot({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsOk());
}
// Unrecognized signature algorithm in the root certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: ?
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, RootUnknownSha256) {
if (!SupportsImportingMismatchedAlgorithms())
return;
int rv = VerifyRoot({kUnknownDigestAlgorithm, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, NameConstraintsFailure) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "name_constraint_bad.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(cert_list[0]->cert_buffer()), {});
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf.get(), "test.example.com", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION));
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION);
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, TestHasTooLongValidity) {
struct {
const char* const file;
bool is_valid_too_long;
} tests[] = {
{"daltonridgeapts.com-chain.pem", false},
{"start_after_expiry.pem", true},
{"pre_br_validity_ok.pem", false},
{"pre_br_validity_bad_121.pem", true},
{"pre_br_validity_bad_2020.pem", true},
{"10_year_validity.pem", false},
{"11_year_validity.pem", true},
{"39_months_after_2015_04.pem", false},
{"40_months_after_2015_04.pem", true},
{"60_months_after_2012_07.pem", false},
{"61_months_after_2012_07.pem", true},
{"825_days_after_2018_03_01.pem", false},
{"826_days_after_2018_03_01.pem", true},
{"825_days_1_second_after_2018_03_01.pem", true},
{"39_months_based_on_last_day.pem", false},
};
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
for (const auto& test : tests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(test.file);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> certificate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, test.file);
ASSERT_TRUE(certificate);
EXPECT_EQ(test.is_valid_too_long,
CertVerifyProc::HasTooLongValidity(*certificate));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, TestKnownRoot) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
certs_dir, "daltonridgeapts.com-chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "daltonridgeapts.com", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk()) << "This test relies on a real certificate that "
<< "expires on May 28, 2021. If failing on/after "
<< "that date, please disable and file a bug "
<< "against rsleevi.";
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.is_issued_by_known_root);
}
// This tests that on successful certificate verification,
// CertVerifyResult::public_key_hashes is filled with a SHA1 and SHA256 hash
// for each of the certificates in the chain.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, PublicKeyHashes) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
ASSERT_EQ(2U, cert_chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(3u, verify_result.public_key_hashes.size());
// Convert |public_key_hashes| to strings for ease of comparison.
std::vector<std::string> public_key_hash_strings;
for (const auto& public_key_hash : verify_result.public_key_hashes)
public_key_hash_strings.push_back(public_key_hash.ToString());
std::vector<std::string> expected_public_key_hashes = {
// Target
"sha256/jpsUnwFFTO7e+l5zQDYhutkf7uA+dCVsWfRvv0UDX40=",
// Intermediate
"sha256/D9u0epgvPYlG9YiVp7V+IMT+xhUpB5BhsS/INjDXc4Y=",
// Trust anchor
"sha256/VypP3VWL7OaqTJ7mIBehWYlv8khPuFHpWiearZI2YjI="};
// |public_key_hashes| does not have an ordering guarantee.
EXPECT_THAT(expected_public_key_hashes,
testing::UnorderedElementsAreArray(public_key_hash_strings));
}
// A regression test for http://crbug.com/70293.
// The certificate in question has a key purpose of clientAuth, and also lacks
// the required key usage for serverAuth.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, WrongKeyPurpose) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "invalid_key_usage_cert.der");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(server_cert.get(), "jira.aquameta.com", flags, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID);
// TODO(crbug.com/649017): Don't special-case builtin verifier.
if (verify_proc_type() != CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN)
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
// TODO(wtc): fix http://crbug.com/75520 to get all the certificate errors
// from NSS.
if (verify_proc_type() != CERT_VERIFY_PROC_NSS &&
verify_proc_type() != CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
// The certificate is issued by an unknown CA.
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
}
// TODO(crbug.com/649017): Don't special-case builtin verifier.
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
// Basic test for returning the chain in CertVerifyResult. Note that the
// returned chain may just be a reflection of the originally supplied chain;
// that is, if any errors occur, the default chain returned is an exact copy
// of the certificate to be verified. The remaining VerifyReturn* tests are
// used to ensure that the actual, verified chain is being returned by
// Verify().
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, VerifyReturnChainBasic) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), google_full_chain.get());
ASSERT_EQ(2U, google_full_chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(
x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(google_full_chain->cert_buffer(),
verify_result.verified_cert->cert_buffer()));
const auto& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[0].get(),
certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[1].get(),
certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
}
// Test that certificates issued for 'intranet' names (that is, containing no
// known public registry controlled domain information) issued by well-known
// CAs are flagged appropriately, while certificates that are issued by
// internal CAs are not flagged.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, IntranetHostsRejected) {
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "reject_intranet_hosts.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = 0;
// Intranet names for public CAs should be flagged:
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc =
new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "webmail", std::string(), 0, nullptr,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
// However, if the CA is not well known, these should not be flagged:
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "webmail", std::string(), 0, nullptr,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
}
// Tests that certificates issued by Symantec's legacy infrastructure
// are rejected according to the policies outlined in
// https://security.googleblog.com/2017/09/chromes-plan-to-distrust-symantec.html
// unless the caller has explicitly disabled that enforcement.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, SymantecCertsRejected) {
constexpr SHA256HashValue kSymantecHashValue = {
{0xb2, 0xde, 0xf5, 0x36, 0x2a, 0xd3, 0xfa, 0xcd, 0x04, 0xbd, 0x29,
0x04, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x84, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x70, 0x34, 0xea, 0x48, 0x92,
0xf8, 0x0e, 0x56, 0xbe, 0xe6, 0x90, 0x24, 0x3e, 0x25, 0x02}};
constexpr SHA256HashValue kGoogleHashValue = {
{0xec, 0x72, 0x29, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x64, 0x20, 0x0a, 0xb6, 0x63, 0x8f,
0x68, 0xac, 0x53, 0x8e, 0x40, 0xab, 0xab, 0x5b, 0x19, 0xa6, 0x48,
0x56, 0x61, 0x04, 0x2a, 0x10, 0x61, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x27, 0x76}};
// Test that certificates from the legacy Symantec infrastructure are
// rejected:
// - dec_2017.pem : A certificate issued after 2017-12-01, which is rejected
// as of M65
// - pre_june_2016.pem : A certificate issued prior to 2016-06-01, which is
// rejected as of M66.
for (const char* rejected_cert : {"dec_2017.pem", "pre_june_2016.pem"}) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), rejected_cert, X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc;
int error = 0;
// Test that a legacy Symantec certificate is rejected.
CertVerifyResult symantec_result;
symantec_result.verified_cert = cert;
symantec_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(kSymantecHashValue));
symantec_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(symantec_result);
CertVerifyResult test_result_1;
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), 0,
nullptr, CertificateList(), &test_result_1);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_SYMANTEC_LEGACY));
EXPECT_TRUE(test_result_1.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SYMANTEC_LEGACY);
// ... Unless the Symantec cert chains through a whitelisted intermediate.
CertVerifyResult whitelisted_result;
whitelisted_result.verified_cert = cert;
whitelisted_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(
HashValue(kSymantecHashValue));
whitelisted_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(kGoogleHashValue));
whitelisted_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(whitelisted_result);
CertVerifyResult test_result_2;
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), 0,
nullptr, CertificateList(), &test_result_2);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(test_result_2.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
// ... Or the caller disabled enforcement of Symantec policies.
CertVerifyResult test_result_3;
error =
verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(),
CertVerifier::VERIFY_DISABLE_SYMANTEC_ENFORCEMENT,
nullptr, CertificateList(), &test_result_3);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(test_result_3.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SYMANTEC_LEGACY);
}
// Test that certificates from the legacy Symantec infrastructure that
// should still be accepted (for now) are accepted.
// - post_june_2016.pem : A certificate issued after 2016-06-01, which is
// not scheduled for distrust until M70.
for (const char* accepted_cert : {"post_june_2016.pem"}) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), accepted_cert, X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc;
int error = 0;
// Test that a Symantec certificate is accepted.
CertVerifyResult symantec_result;
symantec_result.verified_cert = cert;
symantec_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(kSymantecHashValue));
symantec_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(symantec_result);
CertVerifyResult test_result_1;
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), 0,
nullptr, CertificateList(), &test_result_1);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(test_result_1.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SYMANTEC_LEGACY);
}
}
// While all SHA-1 certificates should be rejected, in the event that there
// emerges some unexpected bug, test that the 'legacy' behaviour works
// correctly - rejecting all SHA-1 certificates from publicly trusted CAs
// that were issued after 1 January 2016, while still allowing those from
// before that date, with SHA-1 in the intermediate, or from an enterprise
// CA.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyRejectsSHA1AfterDeprecationLegacyMode) {
base::test::ScopedFeatureList scoped_feature_list;
scoped_feature_list.InitAndEnableFeature(CertVerifyProc::kSHA1LegacyMode);
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = 0;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert;
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 leaf certificates issued before 1 January 2016
// are accepted.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc =
new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_dec_2015.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), 0, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 leaf certificates issued on/after 1 January 2016
// are rejected.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), 0, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
// Enterprise issued SHA-1 leaf certificates issued on/after 1 January 2016
// remain accepted.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), 0, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 intermediates issued on/after 1 January 2016 are,
// unfortunately, accepted. This can arise due to OS path building quirks.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = false;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), 0, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
}
// Test that the certificate returned in CertVerifyResult is able to reorder
// certificates that are not ordered from end-entity to root. While this is
// a protocol violation if sent during a TLS handshake, if multiple sources
// of intermediate certificates are combined, it's possible that order may
// not be maintained.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, VerifyReturnChainProperlyOrdered) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
// Construct the chain out of order.
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(google_full_chain);
ASSERT_EQ(2U, google_full_chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.verified_cert);
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(
x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(google_full_chain->cert_buffer(),
verify_result.verified_cert->cert_buffer()));
const auto& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[0].get(),
certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[1].get(),
certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
}
// Test that Verify() filters out certificates which are not related to
// or part of the certificate chain being verified.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, VerifyReturnChainFiltersUnrelatedCerts) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> unrelated_certificate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "duplicate_cn_1.pem");
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> unrelated_certificate2 =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "aia-cert.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), unrelated_certificate.get());
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), unrelated_certificate2.get());
// Interject unrelated certificates into the list of intermediates.
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(unrelated_certificate->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(unrelated_certificate2->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(google_full_chain);
ASSERT_EQ(4U, google_full_chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.verified_cert);
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(
x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(google_full_chain->cert_buffer(),
verify_result.verified_cert->cert_buffer()));
const auto& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[0].get(),
certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[1].get(),
certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, AdditionalTrustAnchors) {
if (!SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
// |ca_cert| is the issuer of |cert|.
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ca_cert(ca_cert_list[0]);
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
// Verification of |cert| fails when |ca_cert| is not in the trust anchors
// list.
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
// Now add the |ca_cert| to the |trust_anchors|, and verification should pass.
CertificateList trust_anchors;
trust_anchors.push_back(ca_cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, trust_anchors,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
// Clearing the |trust_anchors| makes verification fail again (the cache
// should be skipped).
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
}
// Tests that certificates issued by user-supplied roots are not flagged as
// issued by a known root. This should pass whether or not the platform supports
// detecting known roots.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, IsIssuedByKnownRootIgnoresTestRoots) {
// Load root_ca_cert.pem into the test root store.
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
// Verification should pass.
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
// But should not be marked as a known root.
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_known_root);
}
// Test that CRLSets are effective in making a certificate appear to be
// revoked.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSet) {
if (!SupportsCRLSet()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support CRLSet";
return;
}
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
// First test blocking by SPKI.
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_leaf_spki.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
// Second, test revocation by serial number of a cert directly under the
// root.
crl_set_bytes.clear();
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_root_serial.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSetLeafSerial) {
if (!SupportsCRLSet()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support CRLSet";
return;
}
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList intermediate_cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "intermediate_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, intermediate_cert_list.size());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(intermediate_cert_list[0]->cert_buffer()));
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert_by_intermediate.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(cert_list[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
// Test revocation by serial number of a certificate not under the root.
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_intermediate_serial.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
}
// Tests that CertVerifyProc implementations apply CRLSet revocations by
// subject.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSetRevokedBySubject) {
if (!SupportsCRLSet()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support CRLSet";
return;
}
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// Confirm that verifying the certificate chain with an empty CRLSet succeeds.
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set = CRLSet::EmptyCRLSetForTesting();
int error = Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
std::string crl_set_bytes;
// Revoke the leaf by subject. Verification should now fail.
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_leaf_subject_no_spki.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
// Revoke the root by subject. Verification should now fail.
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_root_subject_no_spki.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
// Revoke the leaf by subject, but only if the SPKI doesn't match the given
// one. Verification should pass when using the certificate's actual SPKI.
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_root_subject.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
}
// Tests that CRLSets participate in path building functions, and that as
// long as a valid path exists within the verification graph, verification
// succeeds.
//
// In this test, there are two roots (D and E), and three possible paths
// to validate a leaf (A):
// 1. A(B) -> B(C) -> C(D) -> D(D)
// 2. A(B) -> B(C) -> C(E) -> E(E)
// 3. A(B) -> B(F) -> F(E) -> E(E)
//
// Each permutation of revocation is tried:
// 1. Revoking E by SPKI, so that only Path 1 is valid (as E is in Paths 2 & 3)
// 2. Revoking C(D) and F(E) by serial, so that only Path 2 is valid.
// 3. Revoking C by SPKI, so that only Path 3 is valid (as C is in Paths 1 & 2)
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSetDuringPathBuilding) {
if (!SupportsCRLSetsInPathBuilding()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test on this platform.";
return;
}
CertificateList path_1_certs;
ASSERT_TRUE(
LoadCertificateFiles({"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-C.pem",
"multi-root-C-by-D.pem", "multi-root-D-by-D.pem"},
&path_1_certs));
CertificateList path_2_certs;
ASSERT_TRUE(
LoadCertificateFiles({"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-C.pem",
"multi-root-C-by-E.pem", "multi-root-E-by-E.pem"},
&path_2_certs));
CertificateList path_3_certs;
ASSERT_TRUE(
LoadCertificateFiles({"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-F.pem",
"multi-root-F-by-E.pem", "multi-root-E-by-E.pem"},
&path_3_certs));
// Add D and E as trust anchors.
ScopedTestRoot test_root_D(path_1_certs[3].get()); // D-by-D
ScopedTestRoot test_root_E(path_2_certs[3].get()); // E-by-E
// Create a chain that contains all the certificate paths possible.
// CertVerifyProcInternalTest.VerifyReturnChainFiltersUnrelatedCerts already
// ensures that it's safe to send additional certificates as inputs, and
// that they're ignored if not necessary.
// This is to avoid relying on AIA or internal object caches when
// interacting with the underlying library.
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(path_1_certs[1]->cert_buffer())); // B-by-C
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(path_1_certs[2]->cert_buffer())); // C-by-D
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(path_2_certs[2]->cert_buffer())); // C-by-E
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(path_3_certs[1]->cert_buffer())); // B-by-F
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(path_3_certs[2]->cert_buffer())); // F-by-E
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(path_1_certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
struct TestPermutations {
const char* crlset;
bool expect_valid;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> expected_intermediate;
} kTests[] = {
{"multi-root-crlset-D-and-E.raw", false, nullptr},
{"multi-root-crlset-E.raw", true, path_1_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-CD-and-FE.raw", true, path_2_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-C.raw", true, path_3_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-unrelated.raw", true, nullptr}};
for (const auto& testcase : kTests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testcase.crlset);
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII(testcase.crlset), &crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (!testcase.expect_valid) {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_NE(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
continue;
}
ASSERT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
if (!testcase.expected_intermediate)
continue;
const auto& verified_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers();
ASSERT_EQ(3U, verified_intermediates.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(verified_intermediates[1].get()), {});
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
EXPECT_TRUE(testcase.expected_intermediate->EqualsExcludingChain(
intermediate.get()))
<< "Expected: " << testcase.expected_intermediate->subject().common_name
<< " issued by " << testcase.expected_intermediate->issuer().common_name
<< "; Got: " << intermediate->subject().common_name << " issued by "
<< intermediate->issuer().common_name;
}
}
// TODO(crbug.com/649017): This is not parameterized by the CertVerifyProc
// because the CertVerifyProc::Verify() does this unconditionally based on the
// platform.
bool AreSHA1IntermediatesAllowed() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
// TODO(rsleevi): Remove this once https://crbug.com/588789 is resolved
// for Windows 7/2008 users.
// Note: This must be kept in sync with cert_verify_proc.cc
return base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN8;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectsMD2) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.has_md2 = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
nullptr /* crl_set */, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectsMD4) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.has_md4 = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
nullptr /* crl_set */, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectsMD5) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.has_md5 = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
nullptr /* crl_set */, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectsPublicSHA1Leaves) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.has_sha1 = true;
result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
nullptr /* crl_set */, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectsPublicSHA1IntermediatesUnlessAllowed) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(ImportCertFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "39_months_after_2015_04.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.has_sha1 = true;
result.has_sha1_leaf = false;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
nullptr /* crl_set */, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
if (AreSHA1IntermediatesAllowed()) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
}
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectsPrivateSHA1UnlessFlag) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.has_sha1 = true;
result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
// SHA-1 should be rejected by default for private roots...
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
nullptr /* crl_set */, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
// ... unless VERIFY_ENABLE_SHA1_LOCAL_ANCHORS was supplied.
flags = CertVerifier::VERIFY_ENABLE_SHA1_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
verify_result.Reset();
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
nullptr /* crl_set */, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
}
enum ExpectedAlgorithms {
EXPECT_MD2 = 1 << 0,
EXPECT_MD4 = 1 << 1,
EXPECT_MD5 = 1 << 2,
EXPECT_SHA1 = 1 << 3,
EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF = 1 << 4,
};
struct WeakDigestTestData {
const char* root_cert_filename;
const char* intermediate_cert_filename;
const char* ee_cert_filename;
int expected_algorithms;
};
const char* StringOrDefault(const char* str, const char* default_value) {
if (!str)
return default_value;
return str;
}
// GTest 'magic' pretty-printer, so that if/when a test fails, it knows how
// to output the parameter that was passed. Without this, it will simply
// attempt to print out the first twenty bytes of the object, which depending
// on platform and alignment, may result in an invalid read.
void PrintTo(const WeakDigestTestData& data, std::ostream* os) {
*os << "root: " << StringOrDefault(data.root_cert_filename, "none")
<< "; intermediate: "
<< StringOrDefault(data.intermediate_cert_filename, "none")
<< "; end-entity: " << data.ee_cert_filename;
}
class CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest
: public testing::TestWithParam<WeakDigestTestData> {
public:
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest() = default;
virtual ~CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest() = default;
};
// Tests that the CertVerifyProc::Verify() properly surfaces the (weak) hash
// algorithms used in the chain.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest, VerifyDetectsAlgorithm) {
WeakDigestTestData data = GetParam();
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
// Build |intermediates| as the full chain (including trust anchor).
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
if (data.intermediate_cert_filename) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.intermediate_cert_filename);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_cert);
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(intermediate_cert->cert_buffer()));
}
if (data.root_cert_filename) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.root_cert_filename);
ASSERT_TRUE(root_cert);
intermediates.push_back(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(root_cert->cert_buffer()));
}
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.ee_cert_filename);
ASSERT_TRUE(ee_cert);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_chain = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
x509_util::DupCryptoBuffer(ee_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(ee_chain);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// Use a mock CertVerifyProc that returns success with a verified_cert of
// |ee_chain|.
//
// This is sufficient for the purposes of this test, as the checking for weak
// hash algorithms is done by CertVerifyProc::Verify().
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> proc =
new MockCertVerifyProc(CertVerifyResult());
proc->Verify(ee_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags, nullptr,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_MD2), verify_result.has_md2);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_MD4), verify_result.has_md4);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_MD5), verify_result.has_md5);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_SHA1), verify_result.has_sha1);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF),
verify_result.has_sha1_leaf);
}
// The signature algorithm of the root CA should not matter.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyRootCATestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_md5_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
{"weak_digest_md4_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
{"weak_digest_md2_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(VerifyRoot,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyRootCATestData));
// The signature algorithm of intermediates should be properly detected.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIntermediateCATestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD5 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD4 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(VerifyIntermediate,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIntermediateCATestData));
// The signature algorithm of end-entity should be properly detected.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyEndEntityTestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md5_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD5 | EXPECT_SHA1},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md4_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD4 | EXPECT_SHA1},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_SHA1},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(VerifyEndEntity,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyEndEntityTestData));
// Incomplete chains do not report the status of the intermediate.
// Note: really each of these tests should also expect the digest algorithm of
// the intermediate (included as a comment). However CertVerifyProc::Verify() is
// unable to distinguish that this is an intermediate and not a trust anchor, so
// this intermediate is treated like a trust anchor.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIncompleteIntermediateTestData[] = {
{NULL, "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
/*EXPECT_MD5 |*/ EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
{NULL, "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
/*EXPECT_MD4 |*/ EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
{NULL, "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
/*EXPECT_MD2 |*/ EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteIntermediate,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIncompleteIntermediateTestData));
// Incomplete chains should report the status of the end-entity.
// Note: really each of these tests should also expect EXPECT_SHA1 (included as
// a comment). However CertVerifyProc::Verify() is unable to distinguish that
// this is an intermediate and not a trust anchor, so this intermediate is
// treated like a trust anchor.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIncompleteEETestData[] = {
{NULL, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md5_ee.pem",
/*EXPECT_SHA1 |*/ EXPECT_MD5},
{NULL, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md4_ee.pem",
/*EXPECT_SHA1 |*/ EXPECT_MD4},
{NULL, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md2_ee.pem",
/*EXPECT_SHA1 |*/ EXPECT_MD2},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(VerifyIncompleteEndEntity,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIncompleteEETestData));
// Differing algorithms between the intermediate and the EE should still be
// reported.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyMixedTestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_MD5},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md5_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_MD5},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_MD4},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(VerifyMixed,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyMixedTestData));
// The EE is a trusted certificate. Even though it uses weak hashes, these
// should not be reported.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyTrustedEETestData[] = {
{NULL, NULL, "weak_digest_md5_ee.pem", 0},
{NULL, NULL, "weak_digest_md4_ee.pem", 0},
{NULL, NULL, "weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", 0},
{NULL, NULL, "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", 0},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(VerifyTrustedEE,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyTrustedEETestData));
// Test fixture for verifying certificate names.
class CertVerifyProcNameTest : public ::testing::Test {
protected:
void VerifyCertName(const char* hostname, bool valid) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(ImportCertFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "subjectAltName_sanity_check.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), hostname, std::string(), 0,
nullptr, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (valid) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID);
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID);
}
}
};
// Don't match the common name
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DontMatchCommonName) {
VerifyCertName("127.0.0.1", false);
}
// Matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv4)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesIpSanIpv4) {
VerifyCertName("127.0.0.2", true);
}
// Matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv6)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesIpSanIpv6) {
VerifyCertName("FE80:0:0:0:0:0:0:1", true);
}
// Should not match the iPAddress SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchIpSanIpv6) {
VerifyCertName("[FE80:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]", false);
}
// Compressed form matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv6)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesIpSanCompressedIpv6) {
VerifyCertName("FE80::1", true);
}
// IPv6 mapped form should NOT match iPAddress SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchIpSanIPv6Mapped) {
VerifyCertName("::127.0.0.2", false);
}
// Matches the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesDnsSan) {
VerifyCertName("test.example", true);
}
// Matches the dNSName SAN (trailing . ignored)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesDnsSanTrailingDot) {
VerifyCertName("test.example.", true);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSan) {
VerifyCertName("www.test.example", false);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSanInvalid) {
VerifyCertName("test..example", false);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSanTwoTrailingDots) {
VerifyCertName("test.example..", false);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSanLeadingAndTrailingDot) {
VerifyCertName(".test.example.", false);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSanTrailingDot) {
VerifyCertName(".test.example", false);
}
// Tests that CertVerifyProc records a histogram correctly when a
// certificate chaining to a private root contains the TLS feature
// extension and does not have a stapled OCSP response.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, HasTLSFeatureExtensionUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "tls_feature_extension.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, 0);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
NULL, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, 1);
histograms.ExpectBucketCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, true, 1);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, 1);
histograms.ExpectBucketCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, false, 1);
}
// Tests that CertVerifyProc records a histogram correctly when a
// certificate chaining to a private root contains the TLS feature
// extension and does have a stapled OCSP response.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, HasTLSFeatureExtensionWithStapleUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "tls_feature_extension.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, 0);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", "dummy response", flags,
nullptr, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, 1);
histograms.ExpectBucketCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, true, 1);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, 1);
histograms.ExpectBucketCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, true, 1);
}
// Tests that CertVerifyProc records a histogram correctly when a
// certificate chaining to a private root does not contain the TLS feature
// extension.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, DoesNotHaveTLSFeatureExtensionUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, 0);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
NULL, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, 1);
histograms.ExpectBucketCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, false, 1);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, 0);
}
// Tests that CertVerifyProc does not record a histogram when a
// certificate contains the TLS feature extension but chains to a public
// root.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, HasTLSFeatureExtensionWithPublicRootUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "tls_feature_extension.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
NULL, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionHistogram, 0);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTLSFeatureExtensionOCSPHistogram, 0);
}
// Test that trust anchors are appropriately recorded via UMA.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, HasTrustAnchorVerifyUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
// Simulate a certificate chain issued by "C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC,
// CN=GTS Root R4". This publicly-trusted root was chosen as it was included
// in 2017 and is not anticipated to be removed from all supported platforms
// for a few decades.
// Note: The actual cert in |cert| does not matter for this testing, so long
// as it's not violating any CertVerifyProc::Verify() policies.
SHA256HashValue leaf_hash = {{0}};
SHA256HashValue intermediate_hash = {{1}};
SHA256HashValue root_hash = {
{0x98, 0x47, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x3e, 0x5e, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x75, 0x16, 0xe5,
0xcb, 0x81, 0x86, 0x06, 0xaa, 0x75, 0x44, 0xa1, 0x9b, 0xe6, 0x7f,
0xd7, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x69, 0x88, 0xe8, 0xd8, 0x43, 0x47}};
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(leaf_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(intermediate_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(root_hash));
const base::HistogramBase::Sample kGTSRootR4HistogramID = 486;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
NULL, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
histograms.ExpectUniqueSample(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram,
kGTSRootR4HistogramID, 1);
}
// Test that certificates with multiple trust anchors present result in
// only a single trust anchor being recorded, and that being the most specific
// trust anchor.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, LogsOnlyMostSpecificTrustAnchorUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
// Simulate a chain of "C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4"
// signing "C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R3" signing an
// intermediate and a leaf.
// Note: The actual cert in |cert| does not matter for this testing, so long
// as it's not violating any CertVerifyProc::Verify() policies.
SHA256HashValue leaf_hash = {{0}};
SHA256HashValue intermediate_hash = {{1}};
SHA256HashValue gts_root_r3_hash = {
{0x41, 0x79, 0xed, 0xd9, 0x81, 0xef, 0x74, 0x74, 0x77, 0xb4, 0x96,
0x26, 0x40, 0x8a, 0xf4, 0x3d, 0xaa, 0x2c, 0xa7, 0xab, 0x7f, 0x9e,
0x08, 0x2c, 0x10, 0x60, 0xf8, 0x40, 0x96, 0x77, 0x43, 0x48}};
SHA256HashValue gts_root_r4_hash = {
{0x98, 0x47, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x3e, 0x5e, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x75, 0x16, 0xe5,
0xcb, 0x81, 0x86, 0x06, 0xaa, 0x75, 0x44, 0xa1, 0x9b, 0xe6, 0x7f,
0xd7, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x69, 0x88, 0xe8, 0xd8, 0x43, 0x47}};
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(leaf_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(intermediate_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(gts_root_r3_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(gts_root_r4_hash));
const base::HistogramBase::Sample kGTSRootR3HistogramID = 485;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
NULL, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
// Only GTS Root R3 should be recorded.
histograms.ExpectUniqueSample(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram,
kGTSRootR3HistogramID, 1);
}
// Test that trust anchors histograms record whether or not
// is_issued_by_known_root was derived from the OS.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, HasTrustAnchorVerifyOutOfDateUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(ImportCertFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "39_months_based_on_last_day.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
// Simulate a certificate chain that is recognized as trusted (from a known
// root), but no certificates in the chain are tracked as known trust
// anchors.
SHA256HashValue leaf_hash = {{0}};
SHA256HashValue intermediate_hash = {{1}};
SHA256HashValue root_hash = {{2}};
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(leaf_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(intermediate_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(root_hash));
result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc = new MockCertVerifyProc(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram, 0);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTrustAnchorVerifyOutOfDateHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", std::string(), flags,
NULL, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
const base::HistogramBase::Sample kUnknownRootHistogramID = 0;
histograms.ExpectUniqueSample(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram,
kUnknownRootHistogramID, 1);
histograms.ExpectUniqueSample(kTrustAnchorVerifyOutOfDateHistogram, true, 1);
}
} // namespace net