UPSTREAM: futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()
We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.
Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.
[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
BUG=chromium:377392
TEST=x86-alex build & boot
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/202733
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
(cherry picked from ToT commit b4e4d7fd5725efee6cabe4c968cea1c40973180e)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I1841c03fd575bb96c4c6c74a33b1b316870ae3a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/202945
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
1 file changed
