// Copyright 2017 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

#include "components/url_formatter/idn_spoof_checker.h"

#include "base/no_destructor.h"
#include "base/numerics/safe_conversions.h"
#include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
#include "base/strings/string_split.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/threading/thread_local_storage.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "net/base/lookup_string_in_fixed_set.h"
#include "third_party/icu/source/common/unicode/schriter.h"
#include "third_party/icu/source/common/unicode/unistr.h"
#include "third_party/icu/source/i18n/unicode/regex.h"
#include "third_party/icu/source/i18n/unicode/translit.h"
#include "third_party/icu/source/i18n/unicode/uspoof.h"

namespace url_formatter {

namespace {

void OnThreadTermination(void* regex_matcher) {
  delete reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(regex_matcher);
}

base::ThreadLocalStorage::Slot& DangerousPatternTLS() {
  static base::NoDestructor<base::ThreadLocalStorage::Slot>
      dangerous_pattern_tls(&OnThreadTermination);
  return *dangerous_pattern_tls;
}

#include "components/url_formatter/top_domains/alexa_skeletons-inc.cc"
// All the domains in the above file have 3 or fewer labels.
const size_t kNumberOfLabelsToCheck = 3;
const unsigned char* g_graph = kDafsa;
size_t g_graph_length = sizeof(kDafsa);

bool LookupMatchInTopDomains(const icu::UnicodeString& ustr_skeleton) {
  std::string skeleton;
  ustr_skeleton.toUTF8String(skeleton);
  DCHECK_NE(skeleton.back(), '.');
  auto labels = base::SplitStringPiece(skeleton, ".", base::KEEP_WHITESPACE,
                                       base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);

  if (labels.size() > kNumberOfLabelsToCheck) {
    labels.erase(labels.begin(),
                 labels.begin() + labels.size() - kNumberOfLabelsToCheck);
  }

  while (labels.size() > 1) {
    std::string partial_skeleton = base::JoinString(labels, ".");
    if (net::LookupStringInFixedSet(
            g_graph, g_graph_length, partial_skeleton.data(),
            partial_skeleton.length()) != net::kDafsaNotFound)
      return true;
    labels.erase(labels.begin());
  }
  return false;
}

}  // namespace

IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
  UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
  checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
  if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
    checker_ = nullptr;
    return;
  }

  // At this point, USpoofChecker has all the checks enabled except
  // for USPOOF_CHAR_LIMIT (USPOOF_{RESTRICTION_LEVEL, INVISIBLE,
  // MIXED_SCRIPT_CONFUSABLE, WHOLE_SCRIPT_CONFUSABLE, MIXED_NUMBERS, ANY_CASE})
  // This default configuration is adjusted below as necessary.

  // Set the restriction level to high. It allows mixing Latin with one logical
  // CJK script (+ COMMON and INHERITED), but does not allow any other script
  // mixing (e.g. Latin + Cyrillic, Latin + Armenian, Cyrillic + Greek). Note
  // that each of {Han + Bopomofo} for Chinese, {Hiragana, Katakana, Han} for
  // Japanese, and {Hangul, Han} for Korean is treated as a single logical
  // script.
  // See http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/#Restriction_Level_Detection
  uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);

  // Sets allowed characters in IDN labels and turns on USPOOF_CHAR_LIMIT.
  SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);

  // Enable the return of auxillary (non-error) information.
  // We used to disable WHOLE_SCRIPT_CONFUSABLE check explicitly, but as of
  // ICU 58.1, WSC is a no-op in a single string check API.
  int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
  uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);

  // Four characters handled differently by IDNA 2003 and IDNA 2008. UTS46
  // transitional processing treats them as IDNA 2003 does; maps U+00DF and
  // U+03C2 and drops U+200[CD].
  deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
      UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
  deviation_characters_.freeze();

  // Latin letters outside ASCII. 'Script_Extensions=Latin' is not necessary
  // because additional characters pulled in with scx=Latn are not included in
  // the allowed set.
  non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
      icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
  non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();

  // The following two sets are parts of |dangerous_patterns_|.
  kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
      UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
      status);
  kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
  combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
      icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
  combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();

  // These Cyrillic letters look like Latin. A domain label entirely made of
  // these letters is blocked as a simplified whole-script-spoofable.
  cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
      icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
  cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();

  cyrillic_letters_ =
      icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
  cyrillic_letters_.freeze();

  DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
  // This set is used to determine whether or not to apply a slow
  // transliteration to remove diacritics to a given hostname before the
  // confusable skeleton calculation for comparison with top domain names. If
  // it has any character outside the set, the expensive step will be skipped
  // because it cannot match any of top domain names.
  // The last ([\u0300-\u0339] is a shorthand for "[:Identifier_Status=Allowed:]
  // & [:Script_Extensions=Inherited:] - [\\u200C\\u200D]". The latter is a
  // subset of the former but it does not matter because hostnames with
  // characters outside the latter set would be rejected in an earlier step.
  lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
      UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
                            "\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
      status);
  lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();

  // Used for diacritics-removal before the skeleton calculation. Add
  // "ł > l; ø > o; đ > d" that are not handled by "NFD; Nonspacing mark
  // removal; NFC".
  // TODO(jshin): Revisit "ł > l; ø > o" mapping.
  UParseError parse_error;
  diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
      UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
      icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
                                   " ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
      UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));

  // Supplement the Unicode confusable list by the following mapping.
  //   - {U+00E6 (æ), U+04D5 (ӕ)}  => "ae"
  //   - {U+00FE (þ), U+03FC (ϼ), U+048F (ҏ)} => p
  //   - {U+0127 (ħ), U+043D (н), U+045B (ћ), U+04A3 (ң), U+04A5 (ҥ),
  //      U+04C8 (ӈ), U+04CA (ӊ), U+050B (ԋ), U+0527 (ԧ), U+0529 (ԩ)} => h
  //   - {U+0138 (ĸ), U+03BA (κ), U+043A (к), U+049B (қ), U+049D (ҝ),
  //      U+049F (ҟ), U+04A1(ҡ), U+04C4 (ӄ), U+051F (ԟ)} => k
  //   - {U+014B (ŋ), U+043F (п), U+0525 (ԥ)} => n
  //   - U+0153 (œ) => "ce"
  //     TODO: see https://crbug.com/843352 for further work on
  //     U+0525 and U+0153.
  //   - {U+0167 (ŧ), U+0442 (т), U+04AD (ҭ), U+050F (ԏ)} => t
  //   - {U+0185 (ƅ), U+044C (ь), U+048D (ҍ), U+0432 (в)} => b
  //   - {U+03C9 (ω), U+0448 (ш), U+0449 (щ), U+0E1E (พ),
  //      U+0E1F (ฟ), U+0E9E (ພ), U+0E9F (ຟ)} => w
  //   - {U+043C (м), U+04CE (ӎ)} => m
  //   - {U+0454 (є), U+04BD (ҽ), U+04BF (ҿ), U+1054 (ၔ)} => e
  //   - U+0491 (ґ) => r
  //   - {U+0493 (ғ), U+04FB (ӻ)} => f
  //   - {U+04AB (ҫ), U+1004 (င)} => c
  //   - U+04B1 (ұ) => y
  //   - U+03C7 (χ), U+04B3 (ҳ), U+04FD (ӽ), U+04FF (ӿ) => x
  //   - U+0503 (ԃ) => d
  //   - {U+050D (ԍ), U+100c (ဌ)} => g
  //   - {U+0D1F (ട), U+0E23 (ร), U+0EA3 (ຣ), U+0EAE (ຮ)} => s
  //   - U+1042 (၂) => j
  //   - {U+0437 (з), U+0499 (ҙ), U+04E1 (ӡ), U+10D5 (ვ), U+1012 (ဒ)} => 3
  //   - {U+0E1A (บ), U+0E9A (ບ)} => u
  extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
      UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
      icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
          "[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
          "[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥ] > n; œ > ce;"
          "[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b;  [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
          "[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
          "[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
          "ԃ  > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
          "[зҙӡვဒ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
      UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
  DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
      << "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
      << u_errorName(status);
}

IDNSpoofChecker::~IDNSpoofChecker() {
  uspoof_close(checker_);
}

bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
                                             bool is_tld_ascii) {
  UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
  int32_t result =
      uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
                   base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
  // If uspoof_check fails (due to library failure), or if any of the checks
  // fail, treat the IDN as unsafe.
  if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
    return false;

  icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
                                  base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));

  // A punycode label with 'xn--' prefix is not subject to the URL
  // canonicalization and is stored as it is in GURL. If it encodes a deviation
  // character (UTS 46; e.g. U+00DF/sharp-s), it should be still shown in
  // punycode instead of Unicode. Without this check, xn--fu-hia for
  // 'fu<sharp-s>' would be converted to 'fu<sharp-s>' for display because
  // "UTS 46 section 4 Processing step 4" applies validity criteria for
  // non-transitional processing (i.e. do not map deviation characters) to any
  // punycode labels regardless of whether transitional or non-transitional is
  // chosen. On the other hand, 'fu<sharp-s>' typed or copy and pasted
  // as Unicode would be canonicalized to 'fuss' by GURL and is displayed as
  // such. See http://crbug.com/595263 .
  if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
    return false;

  // If there's no script mixing, the input is regarded as safe without any
  // extra check unless it falls into one of three categories:
  //   - contains Kana letter exceptions
  //   - the TLD is ASCII and the input is made entirely of Cyrillic letters
  //     that look like Latin letters.
  //   - it has combining diacritic marks.
  // Note that the following combinations of scripts are treated as a 'logical'
  // single script.
  //  - Chinese: Han, Bopomofo, Common
  //  - Japanese: Han, Hiragana, Katakana, Common
  //  - Korean: Hangul, Han, Common
  result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
  if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
    return true;
  if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
      kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
      combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
    // Check Cyrillic confusable only for ASCII TLDs.
    return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
  }

  // Additional checks for |label| with multiple scripts, one of which is Latin.
  // Disallow non-ASCII Latin letters to mix with a non-Latin script.
  // Note that the non-ASCII Latin check should not be applied when the entire
  // label is made of Latin. Checking with lgc_letters set here should be fine
  // because script mixing of LGC is already rejected.
  if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
      !lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
    return false;

  icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
      reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(DangerousPatternTLS().Get());
  if (!dangerous_pattern) {
    // Disallow the katakana no, so, zo, or n, as they may be mistaken for
    // slashes when they're surrounded by non-Japanese scripts (i.e. scripts
    // other than Katakana, Hiragana or Han). If {no, so, zo, n} next to a
    // non-Japanese script on either side is disallowed, legitimate cases like
    // '{vitamin in Katakana}b6' are blocked. Note that trying to block those
    // characters when used alone as a label is futile because those cases
    // would not reach here.
    // Also disallow what used to be blocked by mixed-script-confusable (MSC)
    // detection. ICU 58 does not detect MSC any more for a single input string.
    // See http://bugs.icu-project.org/trac/ticket/12823 .
    // TODO(jshin): adjust the pattern once the above ICU bug is fixed.
    // - Disallow U+30FB (Katakana Middle Dot) and U+30FC (Hiragana-Katakana
    //   Prolonged Sound) used out-of-context.
    // - Dislallow U+30FD/E (Katakana iteration mark/voiced iteration mark)
    //   unless they're preceded by a Katakana.
    // - Disallow three Hiragana letters (U+307[8-A]) or Katakana letters
    //   (U+30D[8-A]) that look exactly like each other when they're used in a
    //   label otherwise entirely in Katakna or Hiragana.
    // - Disallow combining diacritical mark (U+0300-U+0339) after a non-LGC
    //   character. Other combining diacritical marks are not in the allowed
    //   character set.
    // - Disallow dotless i (U+0131) followed by a combining mark.
    // - Disallow U+0307 (dot above) after 'i', 'j', 'l' or dotless i (U+0131).
    //   Dotless j (U+0237) is not in the allowed set to begin with.
    dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
        icu::UnicodeString(
            R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
            R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
            R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
            R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
            R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
            R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
            R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
            R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
            R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
            R"(\u0131[\u0300-\u0339]|)"
            R"([ijl]\u0307)",
            -1, US_INV),
        0, status);
    DangerousPatternTLS().Set(dangerous_pattern);
  }
  dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
  return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}

bool IDNSpoofChecker::SimilarToTopDomains(base::StringPiece16 hostname) {
  size_t hostname_length = hostname.length() - (hostname.back() == '.' ? 1 : 0);
  icu::UnicodeString host(FALSE, hostname.data(), hostname_length);
  // If input has any characters outside Latin-Greek-Cyrillic and [0-9._-],
  // there is no point in getting rid of diacritics because combining marks
  // attached to non-LGC characters are already blocked.
  if (lgc_letters_n_ascii_.span(host, 0, USET_SPAN_CONTAINED) == host.length())
    diacritic_remover_.get()->transliterate(host);
  extra_confusable_mapper_.get()->transliterate(host);

  UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
  icu::UnicodeString skeleton;

  // Map U+04CF (ӏ) to lowercase L in addition to what uspoof_getSkeleton does
  // (mapping it to lowercase I).
  int32_t u04cf_pos;
  if ((u04cf_pos = host.indexOf(0x4CF)) != -1) {
    icu::UnicodeString host_alt(host);
    size_t length = host_alt.length();
    char16_t* buffer = host_alt.getBuffer(-1);
    for (char16_t* uc = buffer + u04cf_pos ; uc < buffer + length; ++uc) {
      if (*uc == 0x4CF)
        *uc = 0x6C;  // Lowercase L
    }
    host_alt.releaseBuffer(length);
    uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, host_alt, skeleton, &status);
    if (U_SUCCESS(status) && LookupMatchInTopDomains(skeleton))
      return true;
  }

  uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, host, skeleton, &status);
  return U_SUCCESS(status) && LookupMatchInTopDomains(skeleton);
}

bool IDNSpoofChecker::IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(
    const icu::UnicodeString& label) {
  // Collect all the Cyrillic letters in |label_string| and see if they're
  // a subset of |cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_|.
  // A shortcut of defining cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ to include [0-9] and
  // [_-] and checking if the set contains all letters of |label|
  // would work in most cases, but not if a label has non-letters outside
  // ASCII.
  icu::UnicodeSet cyrillic_in_label;
  icu::StringCharacterIterator it(label);
  for (it.setToStart(); it.hasNext();) {
    const UChar32 c = it.next32PostInc();
    if (cyrillic_letters_.contains(c))
      cyrillic_in_label.add(c);
  }
  return !cyrillic_in_label.isEmpty() &&
         cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.containsAll(cyrillic_in_label);
}

void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
  if (U_FAILURE(*status))
    return;

  // The recommended set is a set of characters for identifiers in a
  // security-sensitive environment taken from UTR 39
  // (http://unicode.org/reports/tr39/) and
  // http://www.unicode.org/Public/security/latest/xidmodifications.txt .
  // The inclusion set comes from "Candidate Characters for Inclusion
  // in idenfiers" of UTR 31 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr31). The list
  // may change over the time and will be updated whenever the version of ICU
  // used in Chromium is updated.
  const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
      uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
  icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
  allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
  const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
  allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);

  // The sections below refer to Mozilla's IDN blacklist:
  // http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.IDN.blacklist_chars
  //
  // U+0338 (Combining Long Solidus Overlay) is included in the recommended set,
  // but is blacklisted by Mozilla. It is dropped because it can look like a
  // slash when rendered with a broken font.
  allowed_set.remove(0x338u);
  // U+05F4 (Hebrew Punctuation Gershayim) is in the inclusion set, but is
  // blacklisted by Mozilla. We keep it, even though it can look like a double
  // quotation mark. Using it in Hebrew should be safe. When used with a
  // non-Hebrew script, it'd be filtered by other checks in place.

  // The following 5 characters are disallowed because they're in NV8 (invalid
  // in IDNA 2008).
  allowed_set.remove(0x58au);  // Armenian Hyphen
  // U+2010 (Hyphen) is in the inclusion set, but we drop it because it can be
  // confused with an ASCII U+002D (Hyphen-Minus).
  allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);
  // U+2019 is hard to notice when sitting next to a regular character.
  allowed_set.remove(0x2019u);  // Right Single Quotation Mark
  // U+2027 (Hyphenation Point) is in the inclusion set, but is blacklisted by
  // Mozilla. It is dropped, as it can be confused with U+30FB (Katakana Middle
  // Dot).
  allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);
  allowed_set.remove(0x30a0u);  // Katakana-Hiragana Double Hyphen

  // Block {Single,double}-quotation-mark look-alikes.
  allowed_set.remove(0x2bbu);  // Modifier Letter Turned Comma
  allowed_set.remove(0x2bcu);  // Modifier Letter Apostrophe
  // No need to block U+144A (Canadian Syllabics West-Cree P) separately
  // because it's blocked from mixing with other scripts including Latin.

#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
  // The following characters are reported as present in the default macOS
  // system UI font, but they render as blank. Remove them from the allowed
  // set to prevent spoofing until the font issue is resolved.

  // Arabic letter KASHMIRI YEH. Not used in Arabic and Persian.
  allowed_set.remove(0x0620u);

  // Tibetan characters used for transliteration of ancient texts:
  allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
  allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
  allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
  allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
#endif

  // Disallow extremely rarely used LGC character blocks.
  // Cyllic Ext A is not in the allowed set. Neither are Latin Ext-{C,E}.
  allowed_set.remove(0x01CDu, 0x01DCu);  // Latin Ext B; Pinyin
  allowed_set.remove(0x1C80u, 0x1C8Fu);  // Cyrillic Extended-C
  allowed_set.remove(0x1E00u, 0x1E9Bu);  // Latin Extended Additional
  allowed_set.remove(0x1F00u, 0x1FFFu);  // Greek Extended
  allowed_set.remove(0xA640u, 0xA69Fu);  // Cyrillic Extended-B
  allowed_set.remove(0xA720u, 0xA7FFu);  // Latin Extended-D

  uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
}

void IDNSpoofChecker::RestoreTopDomainGraphToDefault() {
  g_graph = kDafsa;
  g_graph_length = sizeof(kDafsa);
}

void IDNSpoofChecker::SetTopDomainGraph(base::StringPiece domain_graph) {
  DCHECK_NE(0u, domain_graph.length());
  g_graph = reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(domain_graph.data());
  g_graph_length = domain_graph.length();
}

}  // namespace url_formatter