blob: ba69033286c0ab3292398657a1ecdbab46d4b458 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h"
#include <vector>
#include "base/callback_helpers.h"
#include "base/files/file_path.h"
#include "base/files/file_util.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/sha1.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/base/test_data_directory.h"
#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
#include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
#include "net/cert/crl_set_storage.h"
#include "net/cert/test_root_certs.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
#include "net/test/cert_test_util.h"
#include "net/test/test_certificate_data.h"
#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
#include "base/android/build_info.h"
#endif
using base::HexEncode;
namespace net {
namespace {
// A certificate for www.paypal.com with a NULL byte in the common name.
// From http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/fulldisc/full-disclosure/70363
unsigned char paypal_null_fingerprint[] = {
0x4c, 0x88, 0x9e, 0x28, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0x44, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xf2, 0x6a, 0xba,
0x1f, 0xe8, 0x1b, 0xd6, 0xab, 0x7b, 0xe8, 0xd7
};
// Mock CertVerifyProc that sets the CertVerifyResult to a given value for
// all certificates that are Verify()'d
class MockCertVerifyProc : public CertVerifyProc {
public:
explicit MockCertVerifyProc(const CertVerifyResult& result)
: result_(result) {}
// CertVerifyProc implementation:
bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const override { return false; }
bool SupportsOCSPStapling() const override { return false; }
protected:
~MockCertVerifyProc() override {}
private:
int VerifyInternal(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) override;
const CertVerifyResult result_;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(MockCertVerifyProc);
};
int MockCertVerifyProc::VerifyInternal(
X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
*verify_result = result_;
verify_result->verified_cert = cert;
return OK;
}
bool SupportsReturningVerifiedChain() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
// Before API level 17, Android does not expose the APIs necessary to get at
// the verified certificate chain.
if (base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->sdk_int() < 17)
return false;
#endif
return true;
}
bool SupportsDetectingKnownRoots() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
// Before API level 17, Android does not expose the APIs necessary to get at
// the verified certificate chain and detect known roots.
if (base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->sdk_int() < 17)
return false;
#elif defined(OS_IOS)
// iOS does not expose the APIs necessary to get the known system roots.
return false;
#endif
return true;
}
// Template helper to load a series of certificate files into a CertificateList.
// Like CertTestUtil's CreateCertificateListFromFile, except it can load a
// series of individual certificates (to make the tests clearer).
template <size_t N>
void LoadCertificateFiles(const char* const (&cert_files)[N],
CertificateList* certs) {
certs->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < N; ++i) {
SCOPED_TRACE(cert_files[i]);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), cert_files[i], X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
certs->push_back(cert);
}
}
} // namespace
class CertVerifyProcTest : public testing::Test {
public:
CertVerifyProcTest()
: verify_proc_(CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault()) {
}
~CertVerifyProcTest() override {}
protected:
bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() {
return verify_proc_->SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors();
}
// Returns true if the underlying CertVerifyProc supports integrating CRLSets
// into path building logic, such as allowing the selection of alternatively
// valid paths when one or more are revoked. As the goal is to integrate this
// into all platforms, this is a temporary, test-only flag to centralize the
// conditionals in tests.
bool SupportsCRLSetsInPathBuilding() {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(USE_NSS_CERTS)
return true;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
int Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
return verify_proc_->Verify(cert, hostname, std::string(), flags, crl_set,
additional_trust_anchors, verify_result);
}
const CertificateList empty_cert_list_;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc_;
};
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS)
// TODO(jnd): http://crbug.com/117478 - EV verification is not yet supported.
#define MAYBE_EVVerification DISABLED_EVVerification
#else
// TODO(rsleevi): Reenable this test once comodo.chaim.pem is no longer
// expired, http://crbug.com/502818
#define MAYBE_EVVerification DISABLED_EVVerification
#endif
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MAYBE_EVVerification) {
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"comodo.chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
intermediates.push_back(certs[2]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> comodo_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set(CRLSet::ForTesting(false, NULL, ""));
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT;
int error = Verify(comodo_chain.get(),
"comodo.com",
flags,
crl_set.get(),
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
// TODO(crbug.com/605457): the test expectation was incorrect on some
// configurations, so disable the test until it is fixed (better to have
// a bug to track a failing test than a false sense of security due to
// false positive).
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, DISABLED_PaypalNullCertParsing) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> paypal_null_cert(
X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(paypal_null_der),
sizeof(paypal_null_der)));
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), paypal_null_cert.get());
const SHA1HashValue& fingerprint =
paypal_null_cert->fingerprint();
for (size_t i = 0; i < 20; ++i)
EXPECT_EQ(paypal_null_fingerprint[i], fingerprint.data[i]);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(paypal_null_cert.get(),
"www.paypal.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID, error);
#elif defined(OS_IOS) && TARGET_IPHONE_SIMULATOR
// iOS returns a ERR_CERT_INVALID error on the simulator, while returning
// ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID on the real device.
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_INVALID, error);
#else
// TOOD(bulach): investigate why macosx and win aren't returning
// ERR_CERT_INVALID or ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID.
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID, error);
#endif
// Either the system crypto library should correctly report a certificate
// name mismatch, or our certificate blacklist should cause us to report an
// invalid certificate.
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN)
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
(CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID | CERT_STATUS_INVALID));
#endif
}
// A regression test for http://crbug.com/31497.
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
// Disabled on Android, as the Android verification libraries require an
// explicit policy to be specified, even when anyPolicy is permitted.
#define MAYBE_IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy \
DISABLED_IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy
#else
#define MAYBE_IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy \
IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy
#endif
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MAYBE_IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "explicit-policy-chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(),
"policy_test.example",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0u, verify_result.cert_status);
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectExpiredCert) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
// Load root_ca_cert.pem into the test root store.
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "expired_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(
certs[0]->os_cert_handle(), intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID);
}
// Test that verifying an ECDSA certificate doesn't crash on XP. (See
// crbug.com/144466).
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, ECDSA_RSA) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir,
"prime256v1-ecdsa-ee-by-1024-rsa-intermediate.pem");
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
// We don't check verify_result because the certificate is signed by an
// unknown CA and will be considered invalid on XP because of the ECDSA
// public key.
}
// Currently, only RSA and DSA keys are checked for weakness, and our example
// weak size is 768. These could change in the future.
//
// Note that this means there may be false negatives: keys for other
// algorithms and which are weak will pass this test.
static bool IsWeakKeyType(const std::string& key_type) {
size_t pos = key_type.find("-");
std::string size = key_type.substr(0, pos);
std::string type = key_type.substr(pos + 1);
if (type == "rsa" || type == "dsa")
return size == "768";
return false;
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectWeakKeys) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
typedef std::vector<std::string> Strings;
Strings key_types;
// generate-weak-test-chains.sh currently has:
// key_types="768-rsa 1024-rsa 2048-rsa prime256v1-ecdsa"
// We must use the same key types here. The filenames generated look like:
// 2048-rsa-ee-by-768-rsa-intermediate.pem
key_types.push_back("768-rsa");
key_types.push_back("1024-rsa");
key_types.push_back("2048-rsa");
key_types.push_back("prime256v1-ecdsa");
// Add the root that signed the intermediates for this test.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "2048-rsa-root.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), root_cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
// Now test each chain.
for (Strings::const_iterator ee_type = key_types.begin();
ee_type != key_types.end(); ++ee_type) {
for (Strings::const_iterator signer_type = key_types.begin();
signer_type != key_types.end(); ++signer_type) {
std::string basename = *ee_type + "-ee-by-" + *signer_type +
"-intermediate.pem";
SCOPED_TRACE(basename);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, basename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), ee_cert.get());
basename = *signer_type + "-intermediate.pem";
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, basename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), intermediate.get());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(intermediate->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(ee_cert->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
0,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
if (IsWeakKeyType(*ee_type) || IsWeakKeyType(*signer_type)) {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY);
EXPECT_NE(CERT_STATUS_INVALID,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY);
}
}
}
}
// Regression test for http://crbug.com/108514.
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
// Disabled on OS X - Security.framework doesn't ignore superflous certificates
// provided by servers. See CertVerifyProcTest.CybertrustGTERoot for further
// details.
#define MAYBE_ExtraneousMD5RootCert DISABLED_ExtraneousMD5RootCert
#else
#define MAYBE_ExtraneousMD5RootCert ExtraneousMD5RootCert
#endif
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MAYBE_ExtraneousMD5RootCert) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-leaf.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> extra_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-root-md5.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), extra_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-root-sha256.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), root_cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(extra_cert->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(server_cert->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
// The extra MD5 root should be discarded
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1u,
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().size());
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().front(),
root_cert->os_cert_handle()));
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.has_md5);
}
// Test for bug 94673.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, GoogleDigiNotarTest) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "google_diginotar.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "diginotar_public_ca_2025.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), intermediate_cert.get());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(intermediate_cert->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(server_cert->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"mail.google.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
// Now turn off revocation checking. Certificate verification should still
// fail.
flags = 0;
error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"mail.google.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
}
// Ensures the CertVerifyProc blacklist remains in sorted order, so that it
// can be binary-searched.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, BlacklistIsSorted) {
// Defines kBlacklistedSPKIs.
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_blacklist.inc"
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kBlacklistedSPKIs) - 1; ++i) {
EXPECT_GT(0, memcmp(kBlacklistedSPKIs[i], kBlacklistedSPKIs[i + 1],
crypto::kSHA256Length))
<< " at index " << i;
}
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, DigiNotarCerts) {
static const char* const kDigiNotarFilenames[] = {
"diginotar_root_ca.pem",
"diginotar_cyber_ca.pem",
"diginotar_services_1024_ca.pem",
"diginotar_pkioverheid.pem",
"diginotar_pkioverheid_g2.pem",
NULL,
};
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
for (size_t i = 0; kDigiNotarFilenames[i]; i++) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> diginotar_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, kDigiNotarFilenames[i]);
std::string der_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(
diginotar_cert->os_cert_handle(), &der_bytes));
base::StringPiece spki;
ASSERT_TRUE(asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki));
std::string spki_sha256 = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki.as_string());
HashValueVector public_keys;
HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
ASSERT_EQ(hash.size(), spki_sha256.size());
memcpy(hash.data(), spki_sha256.data(), spki_sha256.size());
public_keys.push_back(hash);
EXPECT_TRUE(CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(public_keys)) <<
"Public key not blocked for " << kDigiNotarFilenames[i];
}
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, NameConstraintsOk) {
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "name_constraint_good.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(cert_list[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf.get(),
"test.example.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
error = Verify(leaf.get(), "foo.test2.example.com", flags, NULL,
empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, NameConstraintsFailure) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "name_constraint_bad.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(cert_list[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf.get(),
"test.example.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION);
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, TestHasTooLongValidity) {
struct {
const char* const file;
bool is_valid_too_long;
} tests[] = {
{"twitter-chain.pem", false},
{"start_after_expiry.pem", true},
{"pre_br_validity_ok.pem", false},
{"pre_br_validity_bad_121.pem", true},
{"pre_br_validity_bad_2020.pem", true},
{"10_year_validity.pem", false},
{"11_year_validity.pem", true},
{"39_months_after_2015_04.pem", false},
{"40_months_after_2015_04.pem", true},
{"60_months_after_2012_07.pem", false},
{"61_months_after_2012_07.pem", true},
};
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(tests); ++i) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> certificate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, tests[i].file);
SCOPED_TRACE(tests[i].file);
ASSERT_TRUE(certificate);
EXPECT_EQ(tests[i].is_valid_too_long,
CertVerifyProc::HasTooLongValidity(*certificate));
}
}
// TODO(crbug.com/610546): Fix and re-enable this test.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, DISABLED_TestKnownRoot) {
if (!SupportsDetectingKnownRoots()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test on this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "twitter-chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// This will blow up, May 9th, 2016. Sorry! Please disable and file a bug
// against agl. See also PublicKeyHashes.
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "twitter.com", flags, NULL,
empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.is_issued_by_known_root);
}
// TODO(crbug.com/610546): Fix and re-enable this test.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, DISABLED_PublicKeyHashes) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "twitter-chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// This will blow up, May 9th, 2016. Sorry! Please disable and file a bug
// against agl. See also TestKnownRoot.
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "twitter.com", flags, NULL,
empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
ASSERT_LE(3U, verify_result.public_key_hashes.size());
HashValueVector sha1_hashes;
for (size_t i = 0; i < verify_result.public_key_hashes.size(); ++i) {
if (verify_result.public_key_hashes[i].tag != HASH_VALUE_SHA1)
continue;
sha1_hashes.push_back(verify_result.public_key_hashes[i]);
}
ASSERT_LE(3u, sha1_hashes.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
EXPECT_EQ(HexEncode(kTwitterSPKIs[i], base::kSHA1Length),
HexEncode(sha1_hashes[i].data(), base::kSHA1Length));
}
HashValueVector sha256_hashes;
for (size_t i = 0; i < verify_result.public_key_hashes.size(); ++i) {
if (verify_result.public_key_hashes[i].tag != HASH_VALUE_SHA256)
continue;
sha256_hashes.push_back(verify_result.public_key_hashes[i]);
}
ASSERT_LE(3u, sha256_hashes.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
EXPECT_EQ(HexEncode(kTwitterSPKIsSHA256[i], crypto::kSHA256Length),
HexEncode(sha256_hashes[i].data(), crypto::kSHA256Length));
}
}
// A regression test for http://crbug.com/70293.
// The Key Usage extension in this RSA SSL server certificate does not have
// the keyEncipherment bit.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, InvalidKeyUsage) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "invalid_key_usage_cert.der");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(server_cert.get(),
"jira.aquameta.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
// This certificate has two errors: "invalid key usage" and "untrusted CA".
// However, OpenSSL returns only one (the latter), and we can't detect
// the other errors.
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID, error);
#else
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_INVALID, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
#endif
// TODO(wtc): fix http://crbug.com/75520 to get all the certificate errors
// from NSS.
#if !defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) && !defined(OS_IOS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
// The certificate is issued by an unknown CA.
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
#endif
}
// Basic test for returning the chain in CertVerifyResult. Note that the
// returned chain may just be a reflection of the originally supplied chain;
// that is, if any errors occur, the default chain returned is an exact copy
// of the certificate to be verified. The remaining VerifyReturn* tests are
// used to ensure that the actual, verified chain is being returned by
// Verify().
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyReturnChainBasic) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
intermediates.push_back(certs[2]->os_cert_handle());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), google_full_chain.get());
ASSERT_EQ(2U, google_full_chain->GetIntermediateCertificates().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
0,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(
google_full_chain->os_cert_handle(),
verify_result.verified_cert->os_cert_handle()));
const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(return_intermediates[0],
certs[1]->os_cert_handle()));
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(return_intermediates[1],
certs[2]->os_cert_handle()));
}
// Test that certificates issued for 'intranet' names (that is, containing no
// known public registry controlled domain information) issued by well-known
// CAs are flagged appropriately, while certificates that are issued by
// internal CAs are not flagged.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, IntranetHostsRejected) {
if (!SupportsDetectingKnownRoots()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "reject_intranet_hosts.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = 0;
// Intranet names for public CAs should be flagged:
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "intranet", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
// However, if the CA is not well known, these should not be flagged:
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "intranet", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
}
// Test that a SHA-1 certificate from a publicly trusted CA issued after
// 1 January 2016 is rejected, but those issued before that date, or with
// SHA-1 in the intermediate, is not rejected.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyRejectsSHA1AfterDeprecation) {
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = 0;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert;
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 leaf certificates issued before 1 January 2016
// are accepted.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_dec_2015.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 leaf certificates issued on/after 1 January 2016
// are rejected.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
// Enterprise issued SHA-1 leaf certificates issued on/after 1 January 2016
// remain accepted until SHA-1 is disabled.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 intermediates issued on/after 1 January 2016 are,
// unfortunately, accepted. This can arise due to OS path building quirks.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = false;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
}
// Test that the certificate returned in CertVerifyResult is able to reorder
// certificates that are not ordered from end-entity to root. While this is
// a protocol violation if sent during a TLS handshake, if multiple sources
// of intermediate certificates are combined, it's possible that order may
// not be maintained.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyReturnChainProperlyOrdered) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
// Construct the chain out of order.
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[2]->os_cert_handle());
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), google_full_chain.get());
ASSERT_EQ(2U, google_full_chain->GetIntermediateCertificates().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
0,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(
google_full_chain->os_cert_handle(),
verify_result.verified_cert->os_cert_handle()));
const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(return_intermediates[0],
certs[1]->os_cert_handle()));
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(return_intermediates[1],
certs[2]->os_cert_handle()));
}
// Test that Verify() filters out certificates which are not related to
// or part of the certificate chain being verified.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyReturnChainFiltersUnrelatedCerts) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> unrelated_certificate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "duplicate_cn_1.pem");
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> unrelated_certificate2 =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "aia-cert.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), unrelated_certificate.get());
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), unrelated_certificate2.get());
// Interject unrelated certificates into the list of intermediates.
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(unrelated_certificate->os_cert_handle());
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
intermediates.push_back(unrelated_certificate2->os_cert_handle());
intermediates.push_back(certs[2]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), google_full_chain.get());
ASSERT_EQ(4U, google_full_chain->GetIntermediateCertificates().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
0,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(
google_full_chain->os_cert_handle(),
verify_result.verified_cert->os_cert_handle()));
const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(return_intermediates[0],
certs[1]->os_cert_handle()));
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(return_intermediates[1],
certs[2]->os_cert_handle()));
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, AdditionalTrustAnchors) {
if (!SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
// |ca_cert| is the issuer of |cert|.
CertificateList ca_cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ca_cert(ca_cert_list[0]);
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
// Verification of |cert| fails when |ca_cert| is not in the trust anchors
// list.
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
// Now add the |ca_cert| to the |trust_anchors|, and verification should pass.
CertificateList trust_anchors;
trust_anchors.push_back(ca_cert);
error = Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, trust_anchors, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
// Clearing the |trust_anchors| makes verification fail again (the cache
// should be skipped).
error = Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
}
// Tests that certificates issued by user-supplied roots are not flagged as
// issued by a known root. This should pass whether or not the platform supports
// detecting known roots.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, IsIssuedByKnownRootIgnoresTestRoots) {
// Load root_ca_cert.pem into the test root store.
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
// Verification should pass.
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
// But should not be marked as a known root.
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_known_root);
}
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN) || \
(defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS))
// Test that CRLSets are effective in making a certificate appear to be
// revoked.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, CRLSet) {
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
// First test blocking by SPKI.
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_leaf_spki.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSetStorage::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(cert.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
flags,
crl_set.get(),
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_REVOKED, error);
// Second, test revocation by serial number of a cert directly under the
// root.
crl_set_bytes.clear();
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_root_serial.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSetStorage::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(cert.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
flags,
crl_set.get(),
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_REVOKED, error);
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, CRLSetLeafSerial) {
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"quic_root.crt",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList intermediate_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"quic_intermediate.crt",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, intermediate_cert_list.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(intermediate_cert_list[0]->os_cert_handle());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "quic_test.example.com.crt",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(cert_list[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf.get(),
"test.example.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT, verify_result.cert_status);
// Test revocation by serial number of a certificate not under the root.
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_intermediate_serial.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSetStorage::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
error = Verify(leaf.get(),
"test.example.com",
flags,
crl_set.get(),
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_REVOKED, error);
}
// Tests that CRLSets participate in path building functions, and that as
// long as a valid path exists within the verification graph, verification
// succeeds.
//
// In this test, there are two roots (D and E), and three possible paths
// to validate a leaf (A):
// 1. A(B) -> B(C) -> C(D) -> D(D)
// 2. A(B) -> B(C) -> C(E) -> E(E)
// 3. A(B) -> B(F) -> F(E) -> E(E)
//
// Each permutation of revocation is tried:
// 1. Revoking E by SPKI, so that only Path 1 is valid (as E is in Paths 2 & 3)
// 2. Revoking C(D) and F(E) by serial, so that only Path 2 is valid.
// 3. Revoking C by SPKI, so that only Path 3 is valid (as C is in Paths 1 & 2)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, CRLSetDuringPathBuilding) {
if (!SupportsCRLSetsInPathBuilding()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test on this platform.";
return;
}
const char* const kPath1Files[] = {
"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-C.pem", "multi-root-C-by-D.pem",
"multi-root-D-by-D.pem"};
const char* const kPath2Files[] = {
"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-C.pem", "multi-root-C-by-E.pem",
"multi-root-E-by-E.pem"};
const char* const kPath3Files[] = {
"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-F.pem", "multi-root-F-by-E.pem",
"multi-root-E-by-E.pem"};
CertificateList path_1_certs;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(LoadCertificateFiles(kPath1Files, &path_1_certs));
CertificateList path_2_certs;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(LoadCertificateFiles(kPath2Files, &path_2_certs));
CertificateList path_3_certs;
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(LoadCertificateFiles(kPath3Files, &path_3_certs));
// Add D and E as trust anchors.
ScopedTestRoot test_root_D(path_1_certs[3].get()); // D-by-D
ScopedTestRoot test_root_E(path_2_certs[3].get()); // E-by-E
// Create a chain that contains all the certificate paths possible.
// CertVerifyProcTest.VerifyReturnChainFiltersUnrelatedCerts already
// ensures that it's safe to send additional certificates as inputs, and
// that they're ignored if not necessary.
// This is to avoid relying on AIA or internal object caches when
// interacting with the underlying library.
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(path_1_certs[1]->os_cert_handle()); // B-by-C
intermediates.push_back(path_1_certs[2]->os_cert_handle()); // C-by-D
intermediates.push_back(path_2_certs[2]->os_cert_handle()); // C-by-E
intermediates.push_back(path_3_certs[1]->os_cert_handle()); // B-by-F
intermediates.push_back(path_3_certs[2]->os_cert_handle()); // F-by-E
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(
path_1_certs[0]->os_cert_handle(), intermediates);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
struct TestPermutations {
const char* crlset;
bool expect_valid;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> expected_intermediate;
} kTests[] = {
{"multi-root-crlset-D-and-E.raw", false, nullptr},
{"multi-root-crlset-E.raw", true, path_1_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-CD-and-FE.raw", true, path_2_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-C.raw", true, path_3_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-unrelated.raw", true, nullptr}};
for (const auto& testcase : kTests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testcase.crlset);
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII(testcase.crlset), &crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSetStorage::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
if (!testcase.expect_valid) {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_NE(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
continue;
}
ASSERT_EQ(OK, error);
ASSERT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
if (!testcase.expected_intermediate)
continue;
const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& verified_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
ASSERT_EQ(3U, verified_intermediates.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_intermediates[1],
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles());
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
EXPECT_TRUE(testcase.expected_intermediate->Equals(intermediate.get()))
<< "Expected: " << testcase.expected_intermediate->subject().common_name
<< " issued by " << testcase.expected_intermediate->issuer().common_name
<< "; Got: " << intermediate->subject().common_name << " issued by "
<< intermediate->issuer().common_name;
}
}
#endif
enum ExpectedAlgorithms {
EXPECT_MD2 = 1 << 0,
EXPECT_MD4 = 1 << 1,
EXPECT_MD5 = 1 << 2,
EXPECT_SHA1 = 1 << 3,
EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF = 1 << 4,
};
struct WeakDigestTestData {
const char* root_cert_filename;
const char* intermediate_cert_filename;
const char* ee_cert_filename;
int expected_algorithms;
};
// GTest 'magic' pretty-printer, so that if/when a test fails, it knows how
// to output the parameter that was passed. Without this, it will simply
// attempt to print out the first twenty bytes of the object, which depending
// on platform and alignment, may result in an invalid read.
void PrintTo(const WeakDigestTestData& data, std::ostream* os) {
*os << "root: "
<< (data.root_cert_filename ? data.root_cert_filename : "none")
<< "; intermediate: " << data.intermediate_cert_filename
<< "; end-entity: " << data.ee_cert_filename;
}
class CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest
: public CertVerifyProcTest,
public testing::WithParamInterface<WeakDigestTestData> {
public:
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest() {}
virtual ~CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest() {}
};
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest, Verify) {
WeakDigestTestData data = GetParam();
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
ScopedTestRoot test_root;
if (data.root_cert_filename) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.root_cert_filename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), root_cert.get());
test_root.Reset(root_cert.get());
}
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.intermediate_cert_filename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), intermediate_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.ee_cert_filename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), ee_cert.get());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(intermediate_cert->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(ee_cert->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), ee_chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int rv = Verify(ee_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_MD2), verify_result.has_md2);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_MD4), verify_result.has_md4);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_MD5), verify_result.has_md5);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_SHA1), verify_result.has_sha1);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF),
verify_result.has_sha1_leaf);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
// Ensure that MD4 and MD2 are tagged as invalid.
if (data.expected_algorithms & (EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_MD4)) {
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_INVALID,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
}
// Ensure that MD5 is flagged as weak.
if (data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_MD5) {
EXPECT_EQ(
CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
}
// If a root cert is present, then check that the chain was rejected if any
// weak algorithms are present. This is only checked when a root cert is
// present because the error reported for incomplete chains with weak
// algorithms depends on which implementation was used to validate (NSS,
// OpenSSL, CryptoAPI, Security.framework) and upon which weak algorithm
// present (MD2, MD4, MD5).
if (data.root_cert_filename) {
if (data.expected_algorithms & (EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_MD4)) {
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_INVALID, rv);
} else if (data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_MD5) {
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, rv);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(OK, rv);
}
}
}
// Unlike TEST/TEST_F, which are macros that expand to further macros,
// INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P is a macro that expands directly to code that
// stringizes the arguments. As a result, macros passed as parameters (such as
// prefix or test_case_name) will not be expanded by the preprocessor. To work
// around this, indirect the macro for INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P, so that the
// pre-processor will expand macros such as MAYBE_test_name before
// instantiating the test.
#define WRAPPED_INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(prefix, test_case_name, generator) \
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(prefix, test_case_name, generator)
// The signature algorithm of the root CA should not matter.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyRootCATestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_md5_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN)
// MD4 is not supported by OS X / NSS
{"weak_digest_md4_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
#endif
{"weak_digest_md2_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
};
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_VerifyRoot DISABLED_VerifyRoot
#else
#define MAYBE_VerifyRoot VerifyRoot
#endif
INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(MAYBE_VerifyRoot,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyRootCATestData));
// The signature algorithm of intermediates should be properly detected.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIntermediateCATestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD5 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN)
// MD4 is not supported by OS X / NSS
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD4 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
#endif
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
};
// Disabled on NSS - MD4 is not supported, and MD2 and MD5 are disabled.
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_VerifyIntermediate DISABLED_VerifyIntermediate
#else
#define MAYBE_VerifyIntermediate VerifyIntermediate
#endif
WRAPPED_INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
MAYBE_VerifyIntermediate,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIntermediateCATestData));
// The signature algorithm of end-entity should be properly detected.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyEndEntityTestData[] = {
{ "weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md5_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD5 | EXPECT_SHA1 },
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN)
// MD4 is not supported by OS X / NSS
{ "weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md4_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD4 | EXPECT_SHA1 },
#endif
{ "weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_SHA1 },
};
// Disabled on NSS - NSS caches chains/signatures in such a way that cannot
// be cleared until NSS is cleanly shutdown, which is not presently supported
// in Chromium.
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_VerifyEndEntity DISABLED_VerifyEndEntity
#else
#define MAYBE_VerifyEndEntity VerifyEndEntity
#endif
WRAPPED_INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(MAYBE_VerifyEndEntity,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyEndEntityTestData));
// Incomplete chains should still report the status of the intermediate.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIncompleteIntermediateTestData[] = {
{NULL, "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
EXPECT_MD5 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN)
// MD4 is not supported by OS X / NSS
{NULL, "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
EXPECT_MD4 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
#endif
{NULL, "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_SHA1 | EXPECT_SHA1_LEAF},
};
// Disabled on NSS - libpkix does not return constructed chains on error,
// preventing us from detecting/inspecting the verified chain.
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteIntermediate \
DISABLED_VerifyIncompleteIntermediate
#else
#define MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteIntermediate VerifyIncompleteIntermediate
#endif
WRAPPED_INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteIntermediate,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIncompleteIntermediateTestData));
// Incomplete chains should still report the status of the end-entity.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIncompleteEETestData[] = {
{ NULL, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md5_ee.pem",
EXPECT_MD5 | EXPECT_SHA1 },
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN)
// MD4 is not supported by OS X / NSS
{ NULL, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md4_ee.pem",
EXPECT_MD4 | EXPECT_SHA1 },
#endif
{ NULL, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md2_ee.pem",
EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_SHA1 },
};
// Disabled on NSS - libpkix does not return constructed chains on error,
// preventing us from detecting/inspecting the verified chain.
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteEndEntity DISABLED_VerifyIncompleteEndEntity
#else
#define MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteEndEntity VerifyIncompleteEndEntity
#endif
WRAPPED_INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteEndEntity,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIncompleteEETestData));
// Differing algorithms between the intermediate and the EE should still be
// reported.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyMixedTestData[] = {
{ "weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_MD5 },
{ "weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md5_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_MD5 },
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN)
// MD4 is not supported by OS X / NSS
{ "weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_MD2 | EXPECT_MD4 },
#endif
};
// NSS does not support MD4 and does not enable MD2 by default, making all
// permutations invalid.
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
#define MAYBE_VerifyMixed DISABLED_VerifyMixed
#else
#define MAYBE_VerifyMixed VerifyMixed
#endif
WRAPPED_INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
MAYBE_VerifyMixed,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyMixedTestData));
// For the list of valid hostnames, see
// net/cert/data/ssl/certificates/subjectAltName_sanity_check.pem
static const struct CertVerifyProcNameData {
const char* hostname;
bool valid; // Whether or not |hostname| matches a subjectAltName.
} kVerifyNameData[] = {
{ "127.0.0.1", false }, // Don't match the common name
{ "127.0.0.2", true }, // Matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv4)
{ "FE80:0:0:0:0:0:0:1", true }, // Matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv6)
{ "[FE80:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]", false }, // Should not match the iPAddress SAN
{ "FE80::1", true }, // Compressed form matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv6)
{ "::127.0.0.2", false }, // IPv6 mapped form should NOT match iPAddress SAN
{ "test.example", true }, // Matches the dNSName SAN
{ "test.example.", true }, // Matches the dNSName SAN (trailing . ignored)
{ "www.test.example", false }, // Should not match the dNSName SAN
{ "test..example", false }, // Should not match the dNSName SAN
{ "test.example..", false }, // Should not match the dNSName SAN
{ ".test.example.", false }, // Should not match the dNSName SAN
{ ".test.example", false }, // Should not match the dNSName SAN
};
// GTest 'magic' pretty-printer, so that if/when a test fails, it knows how
// to output the parameter that was passed. Without this, it will simply
// attempt to print out the first twenty bytes of the object, which depending
// on platform and alignment, may result in an invalid read.
void PrintTo(const CertVerifyProcNameData& data, std::ostream* os) {
*os << "Hostname: " << data.hostname << "; valid=" << data.valid;
}
class CertVerifyProcNameTest
: public CertVerifyProcTest,
public testing::WithParamInterface<CertVerifyProcNameData> {
public:
CertVerifyProcNameTest() {}
virtual ~CertVerifyProcNameTest() {}
};
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcNameTest, VerifyCertName) {
CertVerifyProcNameData data = GetParam();
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "subjectAltName_sanity_check.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(cert.get());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), data.hostname, 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
if (data.valid) {
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID);
}
}
WRAPPED_INSTANTIATE_TEST_CASE_P(
VerifyName,
CertVerifyProcNameTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyNameData));
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
// Test that CertVerifyProcMac reacts appropriately when Apple's certificate
// verifier rejects a certificate with a fatal error. This is a regression
// test for https://crbug.com/472291.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, LargeKey) {
// Load root_ca_cert.pem into the test root store.
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "large_key.pem"));
// Apple's verifier rejects this certificate as invalid because the
// RSA key is too large. If a future version of OS X changes this,
// large_key.pem may need to be regenerated with a larger key.
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_INVALID, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_INVALID, verify_result.cert_status);
}
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
} // namespace net